Gorgias (489)

Soc.

Then is it the opinion of the many that—as you also said a moment ago—justice means having an equal share, and it is fouler to wrong

than be wronged? Is that so, or not? And mind you are not caught this time in a bashful fit. Is it, or is it not, the opinion of the many that to have one’s equal share, and not more than others, is just, and that it is fouler to wrong than be wronged? Do not grudge me an answer to this, Callicles, so that—if I find you agree with me—I may then have the assurance that comes from the agreement of a man so competent to decide.

Call.

Well, most people do think so.

Soc.

Then it is not only by convention that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, and having one’s equal share is just,

but by nature also: and therefore it looks as though your previous statement was untrue, and your count against me incorrect, when you said that convention and nature are opposites and that I, forsooth, recognizing that, am an unscrupulous debater, turning to convention when the assertion refers to nature, and to nature when it refers to convention.

Call.

What an inveterate driveller the man is! Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be word-catching at your age,

and if one makes a verbal slip, to take that as a great stroke of luck? Do you imagine that, when I said being superior, I meant anything else than better? Have I not been telling you ever so long that I regard the better and the superior as the same thing? Or do you suppose I mean that if a pack of slaves and all sorts of fellows who are good for nothing, except perhaps in point of physical strength, gather together and say something, that is a legal ordinance?

Soc.

Very well, most sapient Callicles: you mean that, do you?

Call.

Certainly I do.

Soc.

Why, my wonderful friend, I have myself been guessing ever so long that you meant something of this sort by superior, and if I repeat my questions it is because I am so keen to know definitely what your meaning may be. For I presume you do not consider that two are better than one, or that your slaves are better than yourself, just because they are stronger than you are. Come now, tell me again from the beginning what it is you mean by the better, since you do not mean the stronger only, admirable sir, do be more gentle with me over my first lessons, or I shall cease attending your school.

Call.

You are sarcastic, Socrates.

Soc.

No, by Zethus, Callicles, whom you made use of just now[*] for aiming a good deal of sarcasm at me: but come, tell us whom you mean by the better.

Call.

I mean the more excellent.

Soc.

So you see, you are uttering mere words yourself, and explaining nothing. Will you not tell us whether by the better and superior you mean the wiser, or some other sort?

Call.

Why, to be sure, I mean those, and very much so.