Parmenides (146-150)

It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself.

It is.

But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest.

Certainly.

Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion?

True.

Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest.

That is clear.

And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true.

How is that?

Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part.

Obviously.

Now is the one a part of itself?

By no means.

Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself.

No, that is impossible.

Nor can it be other than itself.

Certainly not.

Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself?

It must.

Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place?

I think so.

Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time.

Yes, we saw that it was so.

Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself.

So it appears.

Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it?

Certainly.

Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one?

Of course.

Then the one would be other than the others.

Yes, it is other.

Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another?

Of course.

Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?

No.

Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not?

Yes, it would.

But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing.

True.

Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one.

No, it cannot.

Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one.

No.

And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.

Of course not.

But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?

Quite impossible.

But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one.

True.

Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all.

No, they would not.

Well, then, are the not one parts of the one?

Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?

Yes, they would partake of it.

If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.

No.

But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the same as one another.

Yes, we did.

Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?

Yes, let us say that.

The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.

That appears to be the result of our argument.

Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?

Perhaps.

At any rate, since it was found to be other than others, the others must also be other than it.

Of course.

Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?

Certainly.

And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?

Yes.

In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.

What do you mean?

I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?

Yes.

Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?

Yes.

And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or repeatedly?

The same thing, of course.

The word other is the name of something, is it not?

Certainly.

Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name.

Assuredly.

Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name.

Certainly.

In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not?

Yes.

Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things.

So it appears.

But the like is opposed to the unlike.

Yes.

And the other to the same.

That is also true.

But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others.

Yes, it was.

And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others.

Certainly.

In so far as it was other it was shown to be like.

Yes.

Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like.

Yes.

Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other.

So it appears.

Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same.

Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable.

But there is another besides.

What is it?

In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike.

True.

Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others.

Certainly.

And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself.

That is inevitable.

Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things.

I am considering.

The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself.

Right.

And the one is also in other things?

Yes.

Then by reason of being in the others it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself.

That is clear.

Thus the one would touch itself and the other things.

It would.

But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it?

It must.

Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in which it is.

Yes, it must.

The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once; but so long as it is one, it will not?

No, it will not.

The one can no more touch itself than it can be two.

No.

Nor, again, will it touch the others.

Why not?

Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be outside of that which it is to touch, and next it, and there must be no third between them.

True.

Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact.

There must.

And if to the two a third be added in immediate succession, there will be three terms and two contacts.

Yes.

And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms; for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of their contacts. For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts.

Right.

Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less.

True.

But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact.

Of course not.

We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other.

They do not.

Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them.

Of course not.

Then the others are neither one nor two, nor have they the name of any other number.

No.

The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two.

That is clear.

There is no contact if there are no two terms.

No, there is none.

Then the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one, since there is no contact.

No, certainly not.

Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch itself and the others.

So it appears.

And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others?

How is that?

If the one were greater or less than the others, or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures, they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or vice versa, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?

Certainly.

These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not?

For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things.

That is obvious.

Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it.

Necessarily.

What if it be in the whole of one?

Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?

Clearly.

And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?

No, it cannot.

Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it.

Yes.

And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist.

Inevitably.

Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness.

So it appears.

Nor will greatness exist in the one. For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere.

True.

But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness.

No.

Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Evidently not.

Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.

Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality, and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.

And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.

The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others.

Evidently.