Parmenides (141-145)

How, then, being of such a nature, can it be either younger or older or of the same age as anything?

In no way.

Then the one cannot be younger or older or of the same age as anything.

No, evidently not.

And can the one exist in time at all, if it is of such a nature? Must it not, if it exists in time, always be growing older than itself?

It must.

And the older is always older than something younger?

Certainly.

Then that which grows older than itself grows at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it grows older.

What do you mean?

This is what I mean: A thing which is different from another does not have to become different from that which is already different, but it must be different from that which is already different, it must have become different from that which has become so, it will have to be different from that which will be so, but from that which is becoming different it cannot have become, nor can it be going to be, nor can it already be different: it must become different, and that is all.

There is no denying that.

But surely the notion older is a difference with respect to the younger and to nothing else.

Yes, so it is.

But that which is becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself.

So it appears.

But surely it cannot become either for a longer or for a shorter time than itself; it must become and be and be about to be for an equal time with itself.

That also is inevitable.

Apparently, then, it is inevitable that everything which exists in time and partakes of time is of the same age as itself and is also at the same time becoming older and younger than itself.

I see no escape from that.

But the one had nothing to do with such affections.

No, it had not.

It has nothing to do with time, and does not exist in time.

No, that is the result of the argument.

Well, and do not the words was, has become, and was becoming appear to denote participation in past time?

Certainly.

And will be, will become, and will be made to become, in future time?

Yes.

And is and is becoming in the present?

Certainly.

Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.

Very true.

Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future?

It cannot.

Then the one has no share in being at all.

Apparently not.

Then the one is not at all.

Evidently not.

Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if this argument is to be trusted.

That seems to be true.

But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it?

Of course not.

Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it.

Evidently not.

And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it.

Apparently not.

Is it possible that all this is true about the one ?

I do not think so.

Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view?

By all means.

We say, then, that if the one exists, we must come to an agreement about the consequences, whatever they may be, do we not?

Yes.

Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of being?

No, it cannot.

Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one; for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one, nor would one partake of it, but the statement that one is would be equivalent to the statement that one is one but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is. Do you agree?

Certainly.

In the belief that one and being differ in meaning?

Most assuredly.

Then if we say concisely one is, it is equivalent to saying that one partakes of being?

Certainly.

Let us again say what will follow if one is and consider whether this hypothesis must not necessarily show that one is of such a nature as to have parts.

How does that come about ?

In this way: If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?

Inevitably.

And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole?

A part of the whole.

Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part.

Certainly.

Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other? Can unity cease to be a part of being or being to be a part of unity?

No.

And again each of the parts possesses unity and being, and the smallest of parts is composed of these two parts, and thus by the same argument any part whatsoever has always these two parts; for always unity has being and being has unity; and, therefore, since it is always becoming two, it can never be one.

Certainly.

Then it results that the existent one would be infinite in number?

Apparently.

Let us make another fresh start.

In what direction?

We say that the one partakes of being, because it is?

Yes.

And for that reason the one, because it is, was found to be many.

Yes.

Well then, will the one, which we say partakes of being, if we form a mental conception of it alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, be found to be only one, or many?

One, I should say.

Just let us see; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, partakes of being?

Yes, that must be so.

Then if being is one thing and one is another, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being, but they differ from each other by virtue of being other and different.

Certainly.

Therefore the other is neither the same as one nor as being.

Certainly not.

Well, then, if we make a selection among them, whether we select being and the other, or being and one, or one and the other, in each instance we select two things which may properly be called both?

What do you mean?

I will explain. We can speak of being?

Yes.

And we can also speak of one?

Yes, that too.

Then have we not spoken of each of them?

Yes.

And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both?

Certainly.

And also when I speak of being and other, or other and one, in every case I speak of each pair as both?

Yes.

If things are correctly called both, can they be both without being two?

They cannot.

And if things are two, must not each of them be one?

Certainly.

Then since the units of these pairs are together two, each must be individually one.

That is clear.

But if each of them is one, by the addition of any sort of one to any pair whatsoever the total becomes three?

Yes.

And three is an odd number, and two is even?

Of course.

Well, when there are two units, must there not also be twice, and when there are three, thrice, that is, if two is twice one and three is thrice one?

There must.

But if there are two and twice, must there not also be twice two? And again, if there are three and thrice, must there not be thrice three?

Of course.

Well then, if there are three and twice and two and thrice, must there not also be twice three and thrice two?

Inevitably.

Then there would be even times even, odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd.

Yes.

Then if that is true, do you believe any number is left out, which does not necessarily exist?

By no means.

Then if one exists, number must also exist.

It must.

But if number exists, there must be many, indeed an infinite multitude, of existences; or is not number infinite in multitude and participant of existence?

Certainly it is.

Then if all number partakes of existence, every part of number will partake of it?

Yes.

Existence, then, is distributed over all things, which are many, and is not wanting in any existing thing from the greatest to the smallest? Indeed, is it not absurd even to ask that question? For how can existence be wanting in any existing thing?

It cannot by any means.

Then it is split up into the smallest and greatest and all kinds of existences nothing else is so much divided, and in short the parts of existence are infinite.

That is true.

Its parts are the most numerous of all.

Yes, they are the most numerous.

Well, is there any one of them which is a part of existence, but is no part?

How could that be?

But if there is, it must, I imagine, so long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing.

That is inevitable.

Then unity is an attribute of every part of existence and is not wanting to a smaller or larger or any other part.

True.

Can the one be in many places at once and still be a whole? Consider that question.

I am considering and I see that it is impossible.

Then it is divided into parts, if it is not a whole; for it cannot be attached to all the parts of existence at once unless it is divided.

I agree.

And that which is divided into parts must certainly be as numerous as its parts.

It must.

Then what we said just now—that existence was divided into the greatest number of parts—was not true for it is not divided, you see, into any more parts than one, but, as it seems, into the same number as one for existence is not wanting to the one, nor the one to existence, but being two they are equal throughout.

That is perfectly clear.

The one, then, split up by existence, is many and infinite in number.

Clearly.

Then not only the existent one is many, but the absolute one divided by existence, must be many.

Certainly.

And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole; or are not the parts included by the whole?

They must be so.

But surely that which includes is a limit.

Of course.

Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number.

So it appears.

Then if limited it has also extremes ?

Certainly.

Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole?

It will not.

Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end.

It will.

But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes for otherwise it would not be a middle.

No.

And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two.

Yes, it will.

This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other?

How is that?

Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole.

True.

And all the parts are included in the whole ?

Yes.

And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all.

Certainly.

But the whole is the one, is it not?

Of course.

Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be in itself.

Evidently.

But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any. For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all?

It cannot in any way.

Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, it is impossible.

But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in something else or cease to be anywhere at all?

It must.

And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not?

Certainly.

Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other.

It must.

This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?

How is that?