Parmenides (151-155)

But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself, and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; thus the one would be both greater and less than itself.

Yes, it would.

And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one and the others?

Of course.

But that which exists must always exist somewhere.

Yes.

And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can it?

No, it cannot.

But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the others in the one and the one in the others, or else be nowhere at all?

Clearly.

And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

So it appears.

Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others.

Evidently.

And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts.

Of course.

And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in number to itself and the others.

How is that?

If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal.

True.

Then one, being greater and less than itself and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?

Of course.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself.

Clearly.

And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things?

Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others?

Yes, it must.

And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number.

Yes, it will.

And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others?

What do you mean?

If one is, it is thereby shown to be.

Yes.

But is to be anything else than participation in existence together with present time, just as was denotes participation in existence together with past time, and will be similar participation together with future time?

True.

Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.

Certainly.

And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?

Yes.

Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.

Certainly.

Now, do we not remember that there is something becoming younger when the older becomes older than it?

Yes, we do.

Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, would become older than a self which becomes younger?

There is no doubt of it.

Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself.

Yes.

And it is older (is it not) when in becoming older it is in the present time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to the future it cannot avoid the present.

No, it cannot.

Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older? For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future.

True.

But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.

Clearly.

The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become and straightway is older.

Certainly.

It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older; and it was becoming older than itself.

Yes.

And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it not?

It is.

Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present.

Undoubtedly.

But the present is inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is now whenever it is.

Of course.

Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself.

So it appears.

And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time?

For an equal time.

But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age.

Of course.

But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger.

No.

Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself.

I agree.

Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?

I cannot tell.

But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are more than one and have multitude.

Yes, they have.

And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one.

Of course.

Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the greater or the smaller numbers?

The smaller.

Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it not?

Yes.

The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other.

They have.

And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things.

Yes, they would.

Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

It is impossible.

But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.

Yes.

And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not?

Certainly.

And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.

Yes, we shall say that.

The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being; so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.

That is clear.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.

I think that is clear, too.

Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part?

It must.

Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being.

True.

Then one has the same age as all the others so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them. And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one.

Certainly.

In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?

I cannot say.

But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first.

Yes, of course.

Then that which exists can never become older or younger than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same; but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become younger, but it does not become so.

True.

And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger than the other things.

No, it does not.

But see whether they become older and younger in this way.

In what way?

Because the one was found to be older than the others, and the others than the one.

What then?

When the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.

Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller fraction?

By a smaller fraction.

Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?

Yes.

And that which differs less in age from something than before becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which it formerly was older?

Yes, it becomes younger.

But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in turn become older than formerly in relation to the one?

Certainly.

Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but is always becoming older; for the latter always tends towards being younger, and the former towards being older. And conversely the older becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they become older and younger than one another—the one becomes younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into being earlier, and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier.

Yes, that is clear.

Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, and vice versa—from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily become both older and younger than one another, must they not?

Certainly.

For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others.

Perfectly true.

But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?

It must.

Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.

Certainly.

And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?

Certainly.

And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it.

You are right.

And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one.

That is perfectly true.

Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partakes of time, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being?

Yes, it must.

And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it?

No, it cannot.

Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.