Republic (6.503-6.505)

We were saying, if you recollect, that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested[*] in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon[*] this fixed faith[*] under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire,[*] is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well.[*] Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face[*] in fear[*] of starting[*] our present debate.Most true, he said; I remember. We shrank, my friend, I said, from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect[*] guardians we must establish philosophers. Yes, assume it to have been said, said he. Note, then, that they will naturally be few,[*] for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart. What do you mean? he said. Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives;[*] but such men, by reason of their quickness,[*] are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them. You speak truly, he said. And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way[*] when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed,[*] and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them. It is so, he said. But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest[*] education nor in honors nor in rule. And rightly, he said. Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing? Of course. They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke,[*] and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies or whether it will faint and flinch[*] as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body.

That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said. But what do you understand by the greatest studies? You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds[*] in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way[*] was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything,[*] though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough[*] and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around[*] the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline[*] as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve[*] to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest[*] matters? It would indeed,[*] he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question.

You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard[*] that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good[*] by reference to which[*] just things[*] and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail[*] without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit[*] in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good[*]?No, by Zeus, I do not, he said. But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure[*] to be the good, and the finer[*] spirits intelligence or knowledge.[*] Certainly. And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge[*] it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good. Most absurdly, he said. Is it not absurd, said I, if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,[*] as if we understood their meaning when they utter[*] the word good. Most true, he said. Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion[*] of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner[*] compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures[*]? Most assuredly. The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? Certainly. Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes[*] about it? Of course. And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance[*] without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here? Quite so, he said. That, then, which every soul pursues[*] and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition[*] of its reality, but yet baffled[*] and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things,[*] and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens[*] to whose hands we are to entrust all things?