We were saying, if you recollect, 
 that they must approve themselves lovers of the state when tested Cf. 412 D-E, 413 C-414 A, 430 A-B, 537, 540 A, Laws 751 C. in pleasures and pains, and make it apparent that they do not abandon Cf. on 412 E, 513 C, Soph. 230 B. this fixed faith τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is only implied. Cf. 373 C, 598 C. See my article in Transactions of the American Phil. Assoc. xlvii., ( 1916 ) pp. 205-236. under stress of labors or fears or any other vicissitude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith must he rejected, while he who always issued from the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the fire, Cf. Theognis 417-318 παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολίβδῳ χρυσός , ibid ., 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N.). Cf. Zechariah xii. 9 . . . will try them as gold is tried, Job xxiii. 10 When he hath tried me I shall come forth as Gold. Cf. also 1 Peter i. 7, Psalm xii. 6, lxvi. 10, Isaiah xlviii. 10. is to be established as ruler and to receive honors in life and after death and prizes as well. The translation preserves the intentional order of the Greek. For the idea cf. 414 A and 465 D-E and for ἆθλα cf. 460 B. Cobet rejects καὶ ἆθλα , but emendations are needless. Something of this sort we said while the argument slipped by with veiled face Cf. Phaedr. 237 A, Epist. vii. 340 A. For the personification of the λόγος Cf. What Plato Said, 500 on Protag. 361 A-B. So too Cic. Tusc. i. 45. 108 se ita tetra sunt quaedam, ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio. in fear Cf. 387 B. of starting Cf. the proverbial μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα , do not move the immovable, let sleeping dogs lie, in Laws 684 D-E, 913 B. Cf. also Phileb. 16 C, and the American idiom start something. our present debate. Most true, he said; I remember. We shrank, my friend, I said, from uttering the audacities which have now been hazarded. But now let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement that as the most perfect Cf. 503 D. 341 B, 340 E, 342 D. guardians we must establish philosophers. Yes, assume it to have been said, said he. Note, then, that they will naturally be few, Cf. on 494 A. for the different components of the nature which we said their education presupposed rarely consent to grow in one; but for the most part these qualities are found apart. What do you mean? he said. Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of apprehension and their accompaniments, and youthful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you know, that are rarely combined in human nature with a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives; The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an intentional feature of Plato’s style to avoid the monotony of too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely combine are Plato’s two temperaments. The description of the orderly temperament begins with οἷοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to the preceding description of the active temperament. The MSS. have καὶ before νεανικοί ; Heindorf, followed by Wilamowitz, and Adam’s minor edition, put it before οἷοι . Burnet follows the MSS. Adam’s larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοὶ τε after ἕπεται . The right meaning can be got from any of the texts in a good viva voce reading. Plato’s contrast of the two temperaments disregards the possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. on 375 C, and What Plato Said, p. 573 on Theaet. 144 A-B, Cic. Tusc. v. 24. but such men, by reason of their quickness, Cf. Theaet. 144 A ff. are driven about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is gone out of them. You speak truly, he said. And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to fear, are apt to act in the same way A tough of humor in a teacher when confronted with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with difficulty, as if benumbed, For the figure Cf. Meno 80 A, 84 B and C. and are filled with sleep and yawning when an intellectual task is set them. It is so, he said. But we affirmed that a man must partake of both temperaments in due and fair combination or else participate in neither the highest Lit. most precise. Cf. Laws 965 B ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν . education nor in honors nor in rule. And rightly, he said. Do you not think, then, that such a blend will be a rare thing? Of course. They must, then, be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which we then spoke, In 412 C ff. and we have also now to speak of a point we then passed by, that we must exercise them in many studies, watching them to see whether their nature is capable of enduring the greatest and most difficult studies 
 or whether it will faint and flinch Cf. 535 B, Protag. 326 C. as men flinch in the trials and contests of the body. That is certainly the right way of looking at it, he said. But what do you understand by the greatest studies? 
 You remember, I presume, said I, that after distinguishing three kinds For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 A and 436 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on Phaedo 68 C, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 B, and p. 563 on Rep. 435 B-C. in the soul, we established definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and wisdom severally. If I did not remember, he said, I should not deserve to hear the rest. Do you also remember what was said before this? What? We were saying, I believe, that for the most perfect discernment of these things another longer way Cf. Vol. I. on 435 C, Phaedr. 274 A, Friedländer, Platon, ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300 Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic ( Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The longer way is the higher education, which will enable the philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. The outcome of such an education is described as the vision of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the cardinal virtues in terms of the ultimate elements of human welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the idea of good may means teleological interpretation of the universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical treatment in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at the thought from time to time and returns to its own theme. Cf.also Introd. p. xxxv. was requisite which would make them plain to one who took it, but that it was possible to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on this understanding that what we then said was said, falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to me, but if it contented you it is for you to say. Well, he said, it was measurably satisfactory to me, and apparently to the rest of the company. Nay, my friend, said I, a measure of such things that in the least degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything, Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 1 nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris. Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the style but the definite suggestion of Plato’s distaste for relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the statement of the Laws 716 C, that God is the measure of all things ( What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 283-294 between measuring things against one another and measuring them by an idea. Cf. 531 A. though some people sometimes think that they have already done enough Cf. Menex. 234 A, Charm. 158 C, Symp. 204 A, Epist. vii. 341 A. From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used in connection with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the idea of good and the divided line are discussed. and that there is no need of further inquiry. Yes, indeed, he said, many experience this because of their sloth. An experience, said I, that least of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws. That seems likely, he said. Then, said I, such a one must go around Cf. Phaedr. 274 A. the longer way and must labor no less in studies than in the exercises of the body or else, as we were just saying, he will never come to the end of the greatest study and that which most properly belongs to him. Why, are not these things the greatest? said he; but is there still something greater than justice and the other virtues we described? There is not only something greater, I said, but of these very things we need not merely to contemplate an outline i.e. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433. as now, but we must omit nothing of their most exact elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every nerve For πᾶν ποιεῖν cf. on 488 C, for συντεινομένους Euthydem. 288 D. to attain to the utmost precision and clarity of knowledge about other things of trifling moment and not to demand the greatest precision for the greatest Such juxtaposition of forms of the same word is one of the most common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 B ἑνα ἕν , 466 D πάντα πάντῃ , 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς , 496 C οὐδεὶς οὐδέν , Laws 835 C μόνῳ μόνος , 958 B ἑκόντα ἑκών . Cf. also Protag. 327 B, Gorg. 523 B, Symp. 217 B, Tim. 92 b, Phaedo 109 B, Apol. 232 C, and Laws passim . matters? It would indeed, The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 E, Crito 47 C, and D, Laches 195 D, Gorg. 467 E. See critical note. he said; but do you suppose that anyone will let you go without asking what is the greatest study and with what you think it is concerned? By no means, said I; but do you ask the question. You certainly have heard it often, but now you either do not apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble for me 
 by attacking the argument. I suspect it is rather the latter. For you have often heard Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the unavailing quest for the good in the earlier dialogues is an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. Vol. I. on 476 A and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 567, does not understand. that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good Cf. 508 E, 517 C, Cratyl. 418 E. Cf. Phileb. 64 E and What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 A. Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of good to a formula and so seems to speak of it as a mystery. It was so regarded throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and by a majority of modern scholars. Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, Introd. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv. by reference to which Lit. the use of which, i.e. a theory of the cardinal virtues is scientific only if deduced from an ultimate sanction or ideal. just things The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely generalizing color. It makes no difference. and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as no possession either is of any avail For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος Cf. Euthyph. 4 E, Lysis 208 E, 365 B, Charm. 155 E, etc. without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit Cf. 427 A, Phaedr. 275 C, Cratyl. 387 A, Euthyd. 288 E, Laws 751 B, 944 C, etc. in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκἀγαθόν in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the rhythm with Platonic fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Phileb. 65 A and Symp. 210-211 where because of the subject the καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν . ? No, by Zeus, I do not, he said. 
 But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 131; Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ’ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ , and on 329 A-B. There is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato does not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the good. to be the good, and the finer κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. Cf. the American sophisticated in recent use. See too Theaet. 156 A, Aristot. Eth. Nic 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες . spirits intelligence or knowledge. Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of Prodicus (Cf. Protag. 337 A ff.) and Aristotle (Cf. Eth. Nic. 1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose. Certainly. And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge Cf. Euthyd. 281 D, Theaet. 288 D f., Laws 961 E ὁ περὶ τί νοῦς . See Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 650. The demand for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph. 13 D, Laches 192 E, Gorg. 451 A, Charm. 165 C-E, Alc. I. 124 E ff. it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good. Most absurdly, he said. Is it not absurd, said I, if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good, There is no the in the Greek. Emendations are idle. Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. my note on Phileb. 11 B-C in Class. Phil. vol. iii. ( 1908 ) pp. 343-345. as if we understood their meaning when they utter φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (Cf. Theaet. 157 B), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular utterance. the word good. Most true, he said. Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion Lit. wandering, the mark of error. Cf. 484 B, Lysis 213 E, Phaedo 79 C, Soph. 230 B, Phaedr. 263 B, Parmen. 135 E, Laws 962 D. of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 C, Gorg. 456 C-D, Phaedo 62 A. compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures A distinct reference to Callicles’ admission in Gorgias 499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους cf. 499 C, Rep. 561 C, and Phileb. 13 C πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι . Stenzel’s notion ( Studien zur Entw. d. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in the Philebus Plato ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 503 C weit entfernt is uncritical. The Republic merely refers to the Gorgias to show that the question is disputed and the disputants contradict themselves. ? Most assuredly. The outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same things to be both good and bad, are they not? Certainly. Then is it not apparent that there are many and violent disputes ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, Cf. Theaet. 163 C, 158 C, 198 C, Sophist 233 B, 225 B, but less so than ἐρίζειν in Protag. 337 A. about it? Of course. And again, is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 167 C, 172 A-B, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi ( 1921 ) pp. 164-168. without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance satisfies nobody here? Quite so, he said. That, then, which every soul pursues Cf. Gorg. 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες , 505 A-B, Phileb. 20 D, Symp. 206 A, Euthyd. 278 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται , Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129. and for its sake does all that it does, with an intuition Cf. Phileb. 64 A μαντευτέον . Cf. Arnold’s phrase, God and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 approximate language thrown out as it were at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after. of its reality, but yet baffled As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71. and unable to apprehend its nature adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it as about other things, Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the practical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 Toute aultre science est dommageable à celuy qui n’a Ia science de la bonté. and for that reason failing of any possible benefit from other things,— in a matter of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens As in the longer way Plato is careful not to commit himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but postulates it for his guardians. to whose hands we are to entrust all things?