Lesser Hippias (373-376)

Soc.

So please do me a favour and do not refuse to cure my soul; for you will be doing me much more good if you cure my soul of ignorance, than if you were to cure my body of disease.

Now if you choose to deliver a long speech, I tell you beforehand that you would not cure me—for I could not follow you—but if you are willing to answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I think you yourself will not be injured, either. And I might fairly call upon you also, son of Apemantus, for help; for you stirred me up to converse with Hippias; so now, if Hippias is unwilling to answer me, ask him in my behalf to do so.

Eud.

Well, Socrates, I imagine Hippias will need no asking from us;

for that is not what he announced; he announced that he would not avoid the questioning of any man. How is that, Hippias? Is not that what you said?

Hipp.

Yes, I did; but Socrates, Eudicus, always makes confusion in arguments, and seems to want to make trouble.

Soc.

Most excellent Hippias, I do not do these voluntarily at all—for then I should be wise and clever, according to you—but involuntarily, so forgive me; for you say, [*] too, that he who does evil involuntarily ought to be forgiven.

Eud.

And do not refuse, Hippias; but for our sake, and also because of your previous announcements, answer any questions Socrates asks you.

Hipp.

Well, I will answer since you request it. Ask whatever questions you like.

Soc.

I certainly have a great desire, Hippias, to investigate what we are just at present talking about, namely which are better, those who err voluntarily or those who err involuntarily. Now I think the best way to go at the investigation is this. Just answer. Do you call some one a good runner?

Hipp.

I do.

Soc.

And a bad one?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Now, he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs badly a bad one; is it not so?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then does not he who runs slowly run badly, and he who runs fast run well?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

In a race, then, and in running, rapidity is a good thing, and slowness an evil.

Hipp.

Why, of course.

Soc.

Which, then, is the better runner, he who runs slowly voluntarily or he who does so involuntarily?

Hipp.

He who does it voluntarily.

Soc.

Well, then, is not running doing something?

Hipp.

Yes, it is doing.

Soc.

And if doing, is it not also performing some act?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then he who runs badly performs a bad and disgraceful act in a race?

Hipp.

Yes, a bad act of course.

Soc.

But he runs badly who runs slowly?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then the good runner performs this bad and disgraceful act voluntarily, and the bad runner involuntarily?

Hipp.

So it seems.

Soc.

In running, then, he who does bad acts involuntarily is worse than he who does them voluntarily?

Hipp.

Yes, in running.

Soc.

And how is it in wrestling? Which is the better wrestler, he who is thrown voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

He who is thrown voluntarily, as it seems.

Soc.

But is it worse and more disgraceful in a wrestling match to be thrown or to throw one’s opponent?

Hipp.

To be thrown.

Soc.

In wrestling also, then, he who performs bad and disgraceful acts voluntarily is a better wrestler than he who performs them involuntarily.

Hipp.

So it seems.

Soc.

And how is it in every other bodily exercise? Is not he who is the better man in respect to his body able to perform both kinds of acts, the strong and the weak, the disgraceful and the fine,

so that whenever he performs bad acts of a bodily kind, he who is the better man in respect to his body does them voluntarily, but he who is worse does them involuntarily?

Hipp.

That seems to be the case in matters of strength also.

Soc.

And how about grace, Hippias? Does not the better body take ugly and bad postures voluntarily, and the worse body involuntarily? Or what is your opinion?

Hipp.

That is my opinion.

Soc.

Then ungracefulness when voluntary is associated with excellence of the body,

but when involuntary with faultiness.

Hipp.

Apparently.

Soc.

And what do you say about the voice? Which do you say is the better? That which sings out of tune voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

That which does it voluntarily.

Soc.

And that which does it involuntarily is the worse?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Would you choose to possess good or bad things?

Hipp.

Good ones.

Soc.

Would you, then, choose to possess feet that limp voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

Voluntarily.

Soc.

But is not a limp faultiness and ungracefulness of the feet?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Well, is not dimness of sight faultiness of the eyes?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Which eyes, then, would you choose to possess and live with? Those with which one would see dimly and incorrectly voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

Those with which one would do so voluntarily.

Soc.

Those parts, then, of yourself which voluntarily act badly you consider better than those which do so involuntarily?

Hipp.

Yes; that is, in matters of that sort.

Soc.

Well, then, one statement embraces all alike, such as ears and nose and mouth and all the senses

—that those which act badly involuntarily are undesirable because they are bad, and those which do so voluntarily are desirable because they are good.

Hipp.

I think so.

Soc.

Well now, which instruments are better to have to do with, those with which a man does bad work voluntarily, or involuntarily? For instance, is a rudder better with which a man will involuntarily steer badly, or one with which he will do so voluntarily?

Hipp.

One with which he will do so voluntarily.

Soc.

And is not the same true of a bow and a lyre and flutes and all the rest?

Hipp.

Quite true.

Soc.

Well now, would you choose to possess a horse of such spirit that you would ride him badly voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

Voluntarily.

Soc.

Then that spirit is better.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then with the horse of better spirit one would do voluntarily the bad acts of that spirit, but with the one of worse spirit involuntarily?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

And is not that true of a dog, and all other animals?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Well now, then, in the case of an archer is it better to possess the mind which voluntarily misses the mark,

or that which does so involuntarily?

Hipp.

That which does so voluntarily.

Soc.

Then that is the better mind for the purpose of archery?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Is, then, the mind also which errs involuntarily worse than that which errs voluntarily?

Hipp.

Yes, in the case of archery.

Soc.

And how is it in the art of medicine? Is not the mind which does harm to the patients’ bodies voluntarily the more scientific?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

In this art, then, this mind is better than the other.

Hipp.

It is better.

Soc.

Well now, the more musical, whether with lyre or with flute,

and in everything else that concerns all the other arts and sciences—is not that mind better which voluntarily does bad and disgraceful things and commits errors, whereas that which does so involuntarily is worse?

Hipp.

Apparently.

Soc.

And surely we should prefer to possess slaves of such minds that they voluntarily commit errors and do mischief, rather than such as do so involuntarily; we should think them better fitted for their duties.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Well now, should we not wish to possess our own mind in the best possible condition?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Will it, then, be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily, or involuntarily?

Hipp.

But it would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if those who do wrong voluntarily are to be better than those who do so involuntarily.

Soc.

But surely they appear, at least, to be so, from what has been said.

Hipp.

Not to me.

Soc.

I thought, Hippias, they appeared to be so to you also. But now once more answer me: Is not justice either a sort of power or knowledge, or both? Or must not justice inevitably be one or other of these?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Then injustice is a power of the soul, the more powerful soul is the more just, is it not? For we found, my friend, that such a soul was better.

Hipp.

Yes, we did.

Soc.

And what if it be knowledge? Is not the wiser soul more just, and the more ignorant more unjust?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

And what if it be both? Is not the soul which has both, power and knowledge, more just, and the more ignorant more unjust? Is that not inevitably the case?

Hipp.

It appears to be.

Soc.

This more powerful and wiser soul, then, was found to be better and to have more power to do both good and disgraceful acts in every kind of action was it not?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Whenever, then, it does disgraceful acts, it does them voluntarily, by reason of power and art; and these, either one or both of them, are attributes of justice.

Hipp.

So it seems.

Soc.

And doing injustice is doing evil acts, and not doing injustice is doing good acts.

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Will not, then, the more powerful and better soul, when it does injustice, do it voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?

Hipp.

Apparently.

Soc.

Is not, then, a good man he who has a good soul, and a bad man he who has a bad one?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good soul.

Hipp.

But surely he has.

Soc.

Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias, if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man.

Hipp.

I cannot agree with you, Socrates, in that.

Soc.

Nor I with myself, Hippias;

but that appears at the moment to be the inevitable result of our argument; however, as I was saying all along, in respect to these matters I go astray, up and down, and never hold the same opinion; and that I, or any other ordinary man, go astray is not surprising; but if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us also, if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our straying.