Lesser Hippias (369-372)

Hipp.

But I cannot, Socrates, at least, not now offhand.

Soc.

And you never will be able to tell me, I fancy; but if what I say is true, Hippias, you remember what results from our argument.

Hipp.

I do not at all understand what you mean, Socrates.

Soc.

No, for perhaps you are not using your art of memory; for you evidently think it is not necessary; but I will remind you. Do you remember that you said that Achilles was true

and Odysseus was false and wily?

Hipp.

Yes.

Soc.

Do you now, then, perceive that the same man has been found to be false and true, so that if Odysseus was false, he becomes also true, and if Achilles was true, he becomes also false, and the two men are not different from one another, nor opposites, but alike?

Hipp.

Socrates, you are always making intricate arguments of this sort, and, picking out the most difficult part of the argument, you stick to it in detail,

and you do not discuss the whole subject with which the argument deals; for now, if you like, I will prove to you by satisfactory argument based on many pieces of evidence, that Homer made Achilles better than Odysseus and free from falsehood, and Odysseus crafty and a teller of many falsehoods and inferior to Achilles. And, if you like, do you oppose argument to argument, maintaining that the other is better; and these gentlemen here will determine which of us speaks better.

Soc.

Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I; but it is always my custom to pay attention when anyone is speaking, especially when the speaker seems to me to be wise; and because I desire to learn what he means, I question him thoroughly and examine and compare the things he says, in order that I may learn. But if the speaker seems to me to be worthless, I neither ask questions nor care what he says. And by this you will recognize whom I regard as wise; for you will find me persistently asking such a man questions about what he says,

in order that I may profit by learning something.

Soc.

And so now I noticed when you were speaking, that in the lines which you repeated just now to show that Achilles speaks to Odysseus as to a deceiver, it seems to me very strange, if what you say is true,

that Odysseus the wily is nowhere found to have spoken falsely, but Achilles is found to be a wily sort of person, according to your argument; at any rate, he speaks falsely. For he begins by speaking these lines which you just quoted:

For hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his heart and says another,

Hom. Il. 9.312 ff. and a little later says that he would not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon and would not stay at Troy at all, but,—

Tomorrow, after sacrificing to Zeus and all the gods, (he says), I will load my ships well and drag them into the sea; then you shall see, if you like and if it interests you, early in the morning my ships sailing the fishy Hellespont

and my men eagerly rowing in them; and if the glorious Earthshaker should grant me a fair voyage, on the third day I should come to fertile Phthia.

Hom. Il. 9.357 ff.And even before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said:

And now I shall go to Phthia, since it is far better to go home with my beaked ships, and I do not intend to stay here without honor,

and heap up wealth and riches for you.

Hom. Il. 1.169 ff.After he has said these things, at one time in the presence of the whole army and at another before his own comrades, he is nowhere found to have either prepared or attempted to drag down his ships to sail home, but he shows quite superb disregard of truthspeaking. Now I, Hippias, asked my question in the first place because I was perplexed as to which of the two men is represented as better by the poet, and because I thought both were very good, and it was hard to decide which was better, both in regard to falsehood and truth and to virtue in general; for both are similar in this matter.

Hipp.

That is because you do not look at it aright, Socrates. For the falsehoods that Achilles utters, he utters evidently not by design, but against his will, since he is forced by the misfortune of the army to remain and give assistance; but Odysseus utters his falsehoods voluntarily and by design.

Soc.

You are deceiving me, beloved Hippias, and are yourself imitating Odysseus.

Hipp.

Not at all, Socrates. What do you mean and to what do you refer?

Soc.

That you say Achilles did not speak falsely by design, he who was not only a deceiver, but was also such a cheat and plotter, as Homer has represented him, that he is seen to be so much more clever than Odysseus in deceiving him unnoticed without difficulty, that he dared to contradict himself in his presence, and Odysseus did not notice it; at any rate Odysseus does not appear

to have said anything to him which indicates that he noticed his falsehood.

Hipp.

What is this that you say, Socrates?

Soc.

Don’t you know that after he said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away at daybreak, in speaking to Ajax he does not repeat that he is going to sail away, but says something different?

Hipp.

Where, pray?

Soc.

Where he says:

For I shall not be mindful of bloody war until warlike Priam’s son,

the glorious Hector, shall reach the tents and ships of the Myrmidons through slaughter of Argives and shall burn the ships with fire. But at my tent and my black ship I think Hector, though eager for battle, will come to a halt.

Hom. Il. 9.360 ff. Now, Hippias, do you think the son of Thetis and pupil of the most wise Cheiron was so forgetful, that, although a little earlier he had reviled deceivers in the most extreme terms, he himself immediately said to Odysseus that he was going to sail away and to Ajax that he was going to stay, and was not acting by design and in the belief that Odysseus was behind the times and that he himself would get the better of him in just this matter of contrivance and falsehood?

Hipp.

No, I do not agree, Socrates;

but in this case also Achilles was induced by the goodness of his heart to say to Ajax something different from what he had said to Odysseus; whereas Odysseus, when he speaks the truth always speaks with design, and when he speaks falsehood likewise.

Soc.

Then Odysseus, as it seems, is better than Achilles.

Hipp.

Not in the least, Socrates.

Soc.

How is that? Were not those who utter falsehoods voluntarily found to be better than those who do so involuntarily?

Hipp.

And how, Socrates, could those who voluntarily do wrong

and voluntarily and designedly do harm be better than those who do so involuntarily? And there seems to be good reason to forgive a man who unwittingly does wrong or speaks falsehood or does any other evil. And the laws surely are much more severe towards those who do evil and tell falsehoods voluntarily, than towards those who do so involuntarily.

Soc.

Do you see, Hippias, that I speak the truth

when I say that I am persistent in questioning wise men? And this is probably the only good thing about me, as I am otherwise quite worthless; for I am all wrong about facts, and do not know the truth about them. And it is to me sufficient proof of the truth of this, that when I come into contact with one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Greeks bear witness, I am found to know nothing; for there is hardly a single thing about which you and I have the same opinion; and yet what greater proof of ignorance is there than when one disagrees with a wise man? But I have this one remarkable good quality, which is my salvation; for I am not afraid to learn, but I inquire and ask questions and am very grateful to him who answers, and I never failed in gratitude to anyone; for when I have learned anything I have never denied it, pretending that the information was a discovery of my own; but I praise the wisdom of him who instructed me and proclaim what I learned from him. And so now I do not agree with what you say, but disagree very strongly; and I know very well that this is my own fault, because I am the sort of man I am—not to give myself any greater title. For my opinion, Hippias, is the exact opposite of what you say; I think that those who injure people and do wrong and speak falsehood and cheat and err voluntarily, not involuntarily, are better than those who do so involuntarily. Sometimes, however, the opposite of this seems to me to be the case, and I am all astray about these matters, evidently because I am ignorant; but now at the present moment a sort of paroxysm of my disease has come upon me, and those who err in respect to anything voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. And I lay the blame for my present condition upon our previous argument, which causes those who do any of these things involuntarily to appear to me at this moment worse than those who do them voluntarily.