Meno (78)

They needs must.

But do they not hold that those who are harmed are miserable in proportion to the harm they suffer?

That too must be.

And are not the miserable ill-starred?

I think so.

Then is there anyone who wishes to be miserable and ill-starred?

I do not suppose there is, Socrates.

No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such an one: for what is being miserable but desiring evil and obtaining it?

It seems that what you say is true, Socrates, and that nobody desires evil.

Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the desire and ability for good?

Yes, I was.

One part of the statement—the desire—belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another?

Apparently.

But it is plain that if one man is not better than another in this, he must be superior in the ability.

Certainly.

Then virtue, it seems by your account,

I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter.

Then let us see whether your statement is true in another respect; for very likely you may be right. You say virtue is the ability to procure goods?

I do.

And do you not mean by goods such things as health and wealth?

Yes, and I include the acquisition of gold and silver, and of state honors and offices.

Are there any things besides this sort, that you class as goods?

No, I refer only to everything of that sort.

Very well: procuring gold and silver is virtue, according to Meno, the ancestral friend of the Great King. Tell me, do you add to such procuring, Meno, that it is to be done justly and piously, or is this indifferent to you, but even though a man procures these things unjustly, do you call them virtue all the same?

Surely not, Socrates.

Rather, vice.

Yes, of course.

Then it seems that justice or temperance or holiness or some other part of virtue must accompany the procuring of these things;

Yes, for how, without these, could it be virtue?

And not to procure gold and silver, when it would be unjust—what we call the want of such things—is virtue, is it not?

Apparently.