Gorgias (475)

I think not.

And is it not just the same with the fairness of studies also?

Doubtless; and this time, Socrates, your definition is quite fair, when you define what is fair by pleasure and good.

And foul by their opposites, pain and evil?

That needs must follow.

Thus when of two fair things one is fairer, the cause is that it surpasses in either one or both of these effects, either in pleasure, or in benefit, or in both.

Certainly.

And again, when one of two foul things is fouler,

Yes.

Come then, what was it we heard just now about doing and suffering wrong? Were you not saying that suffering wrong is more evil, but doing it fouler?

I was.

Well now, if doing wrong is fouler than suffering it, it is either more painful, and fouler by an excess of pain or evil or both; must not this also be the case?

Yes, of course.

Then let us first consider if doing wrong

Not so at all, Socrates.

Then it does not surpass in pain.

No, indeed.

And so, if not in pain, it can no longer be said to exceed in both.

Apparently.

It remains, then, that it exceeds in the other.

Yes.

In evil.

So it seems.

Then it is by an excess of evil that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.

Yes, obviously.

Now it is surely admitted by the mass of mankind, as it was too by you in our talk a while ago, that doing wrong is fouler than suffering it.

Yes.

And now it has been found to be more evil.

So it seems.

Then would you rather have the evil and foul when it is more than when it is less? Do not shrink from answering, Polus you will get no hurt by it: but submit yourself bravely to the argument, as to a doctor, and reply yes or no to my question.

Why, I should not so choose, Socrates.

And would anybody else in the world?

I think not, by this argument at least.

Then I spoke the truth when I said that neither you nor anyone else in the world would choose to do wrong rather than suffer it, since it really is more evil.

Apparently.