To Archidamus (31-35)

That oracle, moreover, which all would acknowledge to be the most ancient and the most widely accepted and the most trustworthy in existence, recognized Messene as ours, not only at the time when it commanded us to receive the country as a gift from the sons of Cresphontes and to go to the aid of the wronged, but also later, when the war dragged on and both sides sent delegations to Delphi, the Messenians appealing for deliverance and we inquiring how we could most speedily make ourselves masters of their city, the god gave them no answer, thus showing that their appeal was unjust, while to us he revealed both what sacrifices we should perform and to whom we should send for aid.[*]

And yet how could anyone furnish testimony more significant or clearer than this? For it has been shown, first of all (since nothing prevents our restating these points briefly), that we received the country from its rightful owners; secondly, that we took it by war, precisely as most of the cities in those days were founded; further, that we drove out those who had grievously sinned against the children of Heracles—men who by right should have been banished from the sight of all mankind; and, finally, it has been shown that the length of our tenure, the judgement of our enemies, and the oracles of Apollo all confirm our right to the possession of Messene.

Anyone of these facts is enough to refute the assertions of those who presume to allege against us either that we now refuse to conclude peace because of a desire for aggrandizement, or that we then made war on the Messenians because we coveted what was not our own. I might perhaps say more than this about our acquisition of Messene, but I consider what I have already said to be sufficient

Those who advise us to make peace declare that prudent men ought not to take the same view of things in fortunate as in unfortunate circumstances, but rather that they should always consult their immediate situation and accommodate themselves to their fortunes, and should never entertain ambitions beyond their power, but should at such times seek, not their just rights but their best interests.

In all else I agree with them, but no man could ever persuade me that one should ever deem anything to be of greater consequence than justice;[*] for I see that our laws have been made to secure it, that men of character and reputation pride themselves upon practicing it, and that it constitutes the chief concern of all well-regulated states;