Attic Nights (11.1-11.5)

On the origin of the term terra Italia, or

the land of Italy

; of that fine which is called

supreme

; concerning the reason for the name and on the Aternian law; and in what words the

smallest

fine used to be pronounced in ancient days.

TIMAEUS, in the History[*] which he composed in the Greek language about the affairs of the Roman people, and Marcus Varro in his Human Antiquities, [*] wrote that the land of Italy derived its name from a Greek word, oxen in the old Greek tongue being called i)taloi/; for in Italy there was a great abundance of cattle, and in that land pastures are numerous and grazing is a frequent employment.

Furthermore, we may infer that it was for the same reason—namely, since Italy at that time so abounded in cattle—that the fine was established which is called

supreme,

consisting of two sheep and thirty oxen each day, obviously proportionate to the abundance of oxen and the scarcity of sheep. But when a fine of that sort, consisting of cattle and sheep, was pronounced by a magistrate, oxen and sheep were brought, now of small, again of greater value; and this made the penalty of the fine unequal. Therefore later, by the Aternian law, [*] the value of a sheep was fixed at ten pieces of brass, of the cattle at a hundred apiece. Now the

smallest

fine is that of one sheep. The

supreme

fine is of that number which we have mentioned, beyond which it is not lawful to impose a fine for a period of successive days; [*] and for that reason it is called

supreme,

that is, greatest and heaviest.

When therefore even now, according to ancient usage, either the

smallest

or the

supreme

fine is pronounced by Roman magistrates, it is regularly observed that oves (

sheep

) be given the masculine gender; and Marcus Varro has thus recorded the words of the law by which the smallest fine was pronounced: [*]

Against Marcus Terentius, since, though summoned, he has neither appeared nor been excused, I pronounce a fine of one sheep (unum ovem)

; and they declared that the fine did not appear to be legal unless that gender was used.

Furthermore, Marcus Varro, in the twenty-first book of his Human Antiquities, also says [*] that the word for fine (multa) is itself not Latin, but Sabine, and he remarks that it endured even to within his own memory in the speech of the Samnites, who are sprung from the Sabines. But the upstart herd of grammarians have asserted that this word, like some others, is used on the principle of opposites. [*] Furthermore, since it is a usage and custom in language for us to say even now, as the greater number of the early men did, multam dixit and multa dicta est, I have thought it not out of place to note that Marcus Cato spoke otherwise. [*] For in the fourth book of his Origins are these words:

Our commander, if anyone has gone to battle out of order, imposes (facit) a fine upon him.

But it may seem that Cato changed the word with an eye to propriety, since the fine was imposed in camp and in the army, not pronounced in the comitium or in the presence of the people.

That the word elegantia in earlier days was not used of a more refined nature, but of excessive fastidiousness in dress and mode of life, and was a term of reproach.

IT was not customary to call a man elegans, or

elegant,

by way of praise, but up to the time of Marcus Cato that word as a rule was a reproach, not a compliment. And this we may observe both in some other writers, and also in the work of Cato entitled Carmen de Moribus. In this book is the following passage: [*]

They thought that avarice included all the vices; whoever was considered extravagant, ambitious, elegant, vicious or good-fornothing received praise.

[*] It is evident from these words that in days of old the

elegant

man was so called, not because of refinement of character, but because he was excessively particular and extravagant in his attire and mode of life.

Later, the

elegant

man ceased indeed to be reproached, but he was deemed worthy of no commendation, unless his elegance was very moderate. Thus Marcus Tullius commended Lucius Crassus and Quintus Scaevola, not for mere elegance, but for elegance combined with great frugality.

Crassus,

he says, [*]

was the most frugal of elegant men; Scaevola the most elegant of the frugal.

Besides this, in the same work of Cato, I recall also these scattered and cursory remarks: [*]

It was

v2.p.305

the custom,

says he,

to dress becomingly in the forum, at home to cover their nakedness. They paid more for horses than for cooks. The poetic art was not esteemed. If anyone devoted himself to it, or frequented banquets, he was called a 'ruffian.'

This sentiment too, of conspicuous truthfulness, is to be found in the same work: [*]

Indeed, human life is very like iron. If you use it, it wears out; if you do not, it is nevertheless consumed by rust. In the same way we see men worn out by toil; if you toil not, sluggishness and torpor are more injurious than toil.

The nature and degree of the variety of usage in the particle pro; and some examples of the differences.

WHEN I have leisure from legal business, and walk or ride for the sake of bodily exercise, I have the habit sometimes of silently meditating upon questions that are trifling indeed and insignificant, even negligible in the eyes of the uneducated, but are nevertheless highly necessary for a thorough understanding of the early writers and a knowledge of the Latin language. For example, lately in the retirement of Praeneste, [*] as I was taking my evening walk alone, I began to consider the nature and degree of variety in the use of certain particles in the Latin language; for instance, in the preposition pro. For I saw that we had one use in

the priests passed a decree in the name of their order,

and another in

that a witness who had been called in

v2.p.307

said by way of testimony

; that Marcus Cato used it in still another way in the fourth book of his Origins: [*]

The battle was fought and ended before the camp,

and also in the fifth book: [*]

That all the islands and cities were in favour of the Illyrian land.

Also

before the temple of Castor

is one form of expression,

on the rostra

another,

before, or on, the tribunal

[*] another,

in presence of the assembly

another, and

the tribune of the commons interposed a veto in view of his authority

still another. Now, I thought that anyone who imagined that all these expressions were wholly alike and equal, or were entirely different, was in error; for I was of the opinion that this variety came from the same origin and source, but yet that its end was not the same. And this surely anyone will easily understand, [*] if he attentively considers the question and has a somewhat extensive use and knowledge of the early language.

How Quintus Ennius rivalled [*] certain verses of Euripides.

IN the Hecuba of Euripides there are some verses remarkable and brilliant in their diction, their thought and their terseness. Hecuba is speaking to Ulysses: [*]

Thine high repute, how ill soe'er thou speak'st,

Shall sway them; for the same speech carrieth not

Like weight from men contemned and men revered.

These verses Quintus Ennius, when he translated that tragedy, rivalled with no little success. The verses of Ennius are the same in number, as follows: [*]

Though thou speak'st ill, thou wilt the Achivi sway;

The selfsame words and speech have other weight

When spoken by the great and by the obscure.

Ennius, as I have said, did well; but yet ignobiles and opulenti do not seem to express the full force of a)docou/ntwn and dokou/ntwn; for not all who are obscure are contemned, nor are the great all revered.

Some brief notes about the Pyrronian philosophers and the Academics; and of the difference between them.

THOSE whom we call the Pyrronian philosophers are designated by the Greek name skeptikoi/, or

sceptics,

which means about the same as

inquirers

and

investigators.

For they decide nothing and determine nothing, but are always engaged in inquiring and considering what there is in all nature concerning which it is possible to decide and determine. And moreover they believe that they do not see or hear anything clearly, but that they undergo and experience something like seeing and hearing; but they are in doubt as to the nature and character of those very things which cause them those experiences, and they deliberate about them: and they declare that in everything assurance and absolute truth seem so beyond our grasp, owing to the mingling and confusing of the indications of truth and falsehood, that any man who is not rash and precipitate in his judgment ought to use the language which they say was used by Pyrro, the founder of that philosophy:

Does not this matter stand so, rather than so, or is it neither?

For they deny that proofs of anything and its real qualities can be known and understood, and they try in many ways to point this out and demonstrate it. On this subject Favorinus too with great keenness and subtlety has composed ten books, which he entitled Purrwneioi Tro/poi, or The Pyrronian Principles. [*]

It is besides a question of long standing, which has been discussed by many Greek writers, whether the Pyrronian and Academic philosophers differ at all, and to what extent. For both are called

sceptics, inquirers and doubters,

since both affirm nothing and believe that nothing is understood. But they say that appearances, which they call fantasi/ai, are produced from all objects, not according to the nature of the objects themselves, but according to the condition of mind or body of those to whom those appearances come. Therefore they call absolutely all things that affect men's senses ta\ pro/s ti. [*] This expression means that there is nothing at all that is self-dependent or which has its own power and nature, but that absolutely all things have

reference

v2.p.313

to something else

and seem to be such as their appearance is while they are seen, and such as they are formed by our senses, to which they come, not by the things themselves, from which they have proceeded. But although the Pyrronians and the Academics express themselves very much alike about these matters, yet they are thought to differ from each other both in certain other respects and especially for this reason—because the Academics do, as it were,

comprehend

[*] the very fact that nothing can be comprehended, and, as it were, decide that nothing can be decided, while the Pyrronians assert that not even that can by any means be regarded as true, because nothing is regarded as true.