Jugurthine War (96-100)

When Sylla came with his cavalry into Africa, as has just been stated, and arrived at the camp of Marius, though he had hitherto been unskilled and undisciplined in

the art of war, he became, in a short time, the most expert of the whole army. He was besides affable to the soldiers; he conferred favors on many at their request, and on others of his own accord, and was reluctant to receive any in return. But he repaid other obligations more readily than those of a pecuniary nature; he himself demanded repayment from no one; but rather made it his object that as many as possible should be indebted to him. He conversed, jocosely as well as seriously, with the humblest of the soldiers; he was their frequent companion at their works, on the march, and on guard. Nor did he ever, as is usual with depraved ambition, attempt to injure the character of the consul, or of any deserving person. His sole aim, whether in the council or the field, was to suffer none to excel him; to most he was superior. By such conduct he soon became a favorite both with Marius and with the army.

Jugurtha, after he had lost the city of Capsa, and other strong and important places, as well as a vast sum of money, dispatched messengers to Bocchus, requesting him to bring his forces into Numidia as soon as possible, and stating that the time for giving battle was at hand. But finding that he hesitated, and was balancing the inducements to peace and war, he again corrupted his confidants, as on a previous occasion, with presents, and promised the Moor himself a third part of Numidia, should either the Romans be driven from Africa, or the war brought to an end without any diminution of his own territories. Being allured by this offer, Bocchus joined Jugurtha with a large force.

The armies of the kings being thus united, they attacked Marius, on his march to his winter quarters, when scarcely a tenth part of the day remained,[*] expecting that the night, which was now coming on, would be a shelter to them if they were beaten, and no impediment if they should conquer, as they were well acquainted with the country, while either result would be worse for the Romans in the dark. At the very moment, accordingly, that Marius heard from various quarters[*] of the enemy's approach, the enemy themselves were upon him, and before the troops could either form themselves or collect

the baggage, before they could receive even a signal or an order, the Moorish and Getulian horse, not in line, or any regular array of battle, but in separate bodies, as chance had united them, rushed furiously on our men; who, though all struck with a panic, yet, calling to mind what they had done on former occasions, either seized their arms, or protected those who were looking for theirs, while some, springing on their horses, advanced against the enemy. But the whole conflict was more like a rencounter with robbers than a battle; the horse and foot of the enemy, mingled together without standards or order, wounded some of our men, and cut down others, and surprised many in the rear while fighting stoutly with those in front; neither valor nor arms were a sufficient defense, the enemy being superior in numbers, and covering the field on all sides. At last the Roman veterans, who were necessarily well experienced in war,[*] formed themselves, wherever the nature of the ground or chance allowed them to unite, in circular bodies, and thus secured on every side, and regularly drawn up, withstood the attacks of the enemy.

Marius, in this desperate emergency, was not more alarmed or disheartened than on any previous occasion, but rode about with his troop of cavalry, which he had formed of his bravest soldiers rather than his nearest friends, in every quarter of the field, sometimes supporting his own men when giving way, sometimes charging the enemy where they were thickest, and doing service to his troops with his sword, since, in the general confusion, he was unable to command with his voice.

The day had now closed, yet the barbarians abated nothing of their impetuosity, but, expecting that the night would be

in their favor, pressed forward, as their kings had directed them, with increased violence. Marius, in consequence, resolved upon a measure suited to his circumstances, and, that his men might have a place of retreat, took possession of two hills contiguous to each other, on one of which, too small for a camp, there was an abundant spring of water, while the other, being mostly elevated and steep, and requiring little fortification, was suited for his purpose as a place of encampment. He then ordered Sylla, with a body of cavalry, to take his station for the night on the eminence containing the spring, while he himself collected his scattered troops by degrees, the enemy being not less disordered,[*] and led them all at a quick march[*] up the other hill. Thus the kings, obliged by the strength of the Roman position, were deterred from continuing the combat; yet they did not allow their men to withdraw to a distance, but, surrounding both hills with a large force, encamped without any regular order. Having then lighted numerous fires, the barbarians, after their custom, spent most of the night in merriment, exultation, and tumultuous clamor, the kings, elated at having kept their ground, conducting themselves as conquerors. This scene, plainly visible to the Romans, under cover of the night and on the higher ground, afforded great encouragement to them.

Marius, accordingly, deriving much confidence from the imprudence of the enemy, ordered the strictest possible silence to be kept, not allowing even the trumpets, as was usual, to be sounded when the watches were changed ;[*] and then, when day approached, and the enemy were fatigued and just sinking to sleep, he ordered the sentinels, with the trumpeters of the auxiliary cohorts,[*] cavalry, and legions, to sound all

their instruments at once, and the soldiers, at the same time, to raise a shout, and sally forth from the camp[*] upon the enemy. The Moors and Getulians, suddenly roused by the strange and terrible noise, could neither flee, nor take up arms, could neither act, nor provide for their security, so completely had fear, like a stupor,[*] from the uproar and shouting, the absence of support, the charge of our troops, and the tumult and alarm, seized upon them all. The whole of them were consequently routed and put to flight; most of their arms, and military standards, were taken; and more were killed in this than in all former battles, their escape being impeded by sleep and the sudden alarm.

Marius now continued the route, which he had commenced, toward his winter quarters, which, for the convenience of getting provisions, he had determined to fix in the towns on the coast. He was not, however, rendered careless or presumptuous by his victory, but marched with his army in form of a square,[*] just as if he were in sight of the enemy. Sylla, with his cavalry, was on the right; Aulus Manlius, with the slingers and archers, and Ligurian cohorts, had the command on the left; the tribunes, with the light-armed infantry, the consul had placed in the front and rear. The deserters, whose lives were of little value, and who were well acquainted with the country, observed the route of the enemy. Marius himself, too, as if no other were placed in charge, attended to every thing, went through the whole of the troops, and praised or blamed them according to their desert. He was always armed and on the alert, and obliged his men to imitate his example. He fortified his camp with the same caution with which he marched; stationing cohorts of the legions to watch the gates, and the auxiliary cavalry in front, and others upon the rampart

and lines. He went round the posts in person, not from suspicion that his orders would not be observed, but that the labor of the soldiers, shared equally by their general, might be endured by them with cheerfulness.[*] Indeed, Marius, as well at this as at other periods of the war, kept his men to their duty rather by the dread of shame[*] than of severity; a course which many said was adopted from desire of popularity, but some thought it was because he took pleasure in toils to which he had been accustomed from his youth, and in exertions which other men call perfect miseries. The public interest, however, was served with as much efficiency and honor as it could have been under the most rigorous command.