Jugurthine War (41-45)

The prevalence of parties among the people, and of factions in the senate, and of all evil practices attendant on them, had its origin at Rome, a few years before, during a period of tranquillity, and amid the abundance of all that mankind regarded as desirable. For, before the destruction of Carthage, the senate and people managed the affairs of the republic with mutual moderation and forbearance; there were no contests among the citizens for honor or ascendency; but the dread of an enemy kept the state in order. When that fear, however, was removed from their minds, licentiousness and pride, evils which prosperity loves to foster, immediately began to prevail; and thus peace, which they had so eagerly desired in adversity, proved, when they had obtained it, more grievous and fatal than adversity itself. The patricians carried their authority, and the people their liberty, to excess; every man took, snatched, and seized[*] what he could. There was a complete division into two factions, and the republic was torn in pieces between them. Yet the nobility still maintained an ascendency by conspiring together; for the strength of the people, being disunited and dispersed among a multitude, was less able to exert itself. Things were accordingly directed, both at home and in the field, by the will of a small number of men, at whose disposal were the treasury, the provinces, offices, honors, and triumphs; while the people were oppressed with military service and with poverty, and the generals divided the spoils of war with a few of their friends. The parents and children of the soldiers,[*] meantime,

Thus when Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, whose forefathers had done much to increase the power of the state in the Punic and other wars, began to vindicate the liberty of the people, and to expose the misconduct of the few, the nobility, conscious of guilt, and seized with alarm, endeavored, sometimes by means of the allies and Latins,[*] and sometimes by means of the equestrian order, whom the hope of coalition with the patricians had detached from the people, to put a stop to the proceedings of the Gracchi; and first they killed Tiberius, and a few years after Caius, who pursued the same measures as his brother, the one when he was tribune, and the other when he was one of a triumvirate for settling colonies; and with them they cut off Marcus Fulvius Flaccus. In the Gracchi, indeed, it must be allowed that, from their ardor for victory, there was not sufficient prudence. But to a reasonable man it is more agreeable to submit[*] to injustice than to triumph over it by improper

But were I to attempt to treat of the animosities of parties, and of the morals of the state, with minuteness of detail, and suitably to the vastness of the subject, time would fail me sooner than matter. I therefore return to my subject.

After the treaty of Aulus, and the disgraceful flight of our army, Quintus Metellus and Marcus Silanus, the consuls elect, divided the provinces between them; and Numidia fell to Metellus, a man of energy, and, though an opponent of the popular party, yet of a character uniformly irreproachable.[*] He, as soon as he entered on his office, regarded all other things as common to himself and his colleague,[*] but directed his chief attention to the war which he was to conduct. Distrusting, therefore, the old army, he began to raise new troops, to procure auxiliaries from all parts, and to provide arms, horses, and other military requisites, besides provisions in abundance, and every thing else which was likely to be of use in a war varied in its character, and demanding great resources. To assist in accomplishing these objects, the allies and Latins, by the appointment of the senate, and different princes[*] of their own accord, sent supplies; and the whole state exerted itself in the cause with the greatest zeal. Having at length prepared and arranged every thing according to his wishes, Metellus set out

When he arrived in Africa, the command of the army was resigned to him by Albinus, the proconsul;[*] but it was an army spiritless and unwarlike; incapable of encountering either danger or fatigue; more ready with the tongue than with the sword; accustomed to plunder our allies, while itself was the prey of the enemy; unchecked by discipline, and void of all regard to its character. The new general, accordingly, felt more anxiety from the corrupt morals of the men, than confidence or hope from their numbers. He determined, however, though the delay of the comitia had shortened his summer campaign, and though he knew his countrymen to be anxious for the result of his proceedings, not to commence operations, until, by a revival of the old discipline, he had brought the soldiers to bear fatigue. For Albinus, dispirited by the disaster of his brother Aulus and his army, and having resolved not to leave the province during the portion of the summer that he was to command, had kept the soldiers, for the most part, in a stationary camp,[*] except when stench, or want of forage, obiged them to remove. But neither had the camp been fortified,[*] nor the watches kept, according to military usage; every one had been allowed to leave his post when he pleased. The camp-followers, mingled with the soldiers, wandered about day and

But I am assured that Metellus, in these difficult circumstances, no less than in his operations against the enemy, proved himself a great and wise man; so just a medium did he observe between an affectation of popularity and an excessive enforcement of discipline. His first measure was to remove incentives to idleness, by a general order that no one should sell bread, or any other dressed provisions, in the camp; that no sutlers should follow the army; and that no common soldier should have a servant, or beast of burden, either in a camp or on a march. He made the strictest regulations, too, with regard to other things.[*] He moved his camp daily, exercising the soldiers by marches across the country; he fortified it with a rampart and a trench, exactly as if the enemy had been at hand; he placed numerous sentinels[*] by night, and went the rounds with his officers; and, when the army was on the march, he would be at one time in the front, at another in the rear, and at another in the center, to see that none quitted their ranks, that the men kept close to their standards, and that every soldier carried his provisions and his arms. Thus by preventing rather than punishing irregularities, he in a short time rendered his army effective.