For A. Cluentius (61-65)

Then indeed those decisions of the senatorial body, branded with no imaginary odium, but with real and conspicuous infamy, covered with disgrace and ignominy, would have left no room for any defence of them. For what answer could these judges make if any one asked of them, “You have condemned Scamander; of what crime? Because, forsooth, he attempted to murder Habitus by poison, by the agency of the slave of the doctor. What was Scamander to gain by the death of Habitus? Nothing; but he was the agent of Oppianicus. You have condemned Caius Fabricius; why so? Because, as he himself was exceedingly intimate with Oppianicus, and as his freedman had been detected in the very act, it was not proved that he was entirely ignorant of his design.” If, then, they had acquitted Oppianicus himself, after he had been twice condemned by their own decisions, who could have endured such infamy on the part of the tribunals, such inconsistency in judicial decisions, and such caprice on the part of the judges?

Many reasons can be alleged why it was necessary that this decision should be given; but I will meet your expectation half-way, O judges. For although I am listened to by you in such a way, that I am persuaded no one was ever listened to more kindly or more attentively, still your silent expectation has been for some time calling me in another direction, and seeming to chide me thus:—“What then? Do you deny that that sentence was procured by corruption?” I do not deny that, but I say that the corruption was not practiced by my client. By whom, then, was it practiced? I think, in the first place, if it had been uncertain what was likely to be the result of that trial, that still it would have been more probable that he would have recourse to corruption, who was afraid of being himself convicted, than he who was only afraid of another man being acquitted. In the second place, as it was doubtful to no one what decision must inevitably be given, that he would employ such means, who for any reason distrusted his case, rather than he who had every possible reason to feel confidence in his. Lastly, that at all events, he who had twice failed before those judges must have been the corrupter, rather than he who had twice established his case to their satisfaction.

One thing is quite certain. No one will be so unjust to Cluentius, as not to grant to me, if it be proved that that tribunal was bribed, that it was bribed either by Habitus or by Oppianicus. If I prove that it was not bribed by Habitus, I prove that it was by Oppianicus,—I clear Habitus. Wherefore, although I have already established plainly enough that the one had no reason whatever for having recourse to bribery, (and from this alone it follows that the bribery must have been committed by Oppianicus,) still you shall have separate proofs of this particular point.

I say that Statius Albius gave Caius Attius Stalenus the judge a large sum of money to influence his decision. Does any one deny it? I appeal to you, O Oppianicus; to you, O Titus Attius; the one of whom deplores that conviction with his eloquence, the other with silent piety. Dare to deny it, if you can, that money was given by Oppianicus to Stalenus the judge. Deny it—deny it, I say, where you stand. Why are you silent? But you cannot deny it, for you sought to recover what had been paid. You have admitted it,—you have recovered it. With what face now do you dare to mention a decision given through corruption, when you confess that money was given by the opposite side to the judge before trial, and recovered from him after the trial?