The Enchiridion (26-30)

The will of Nature may be learned from things upon which we are all agreed. As, when our neighbor’s boy has broken a cup, or the like, we are ready at once to say, These are casualties that will happen; be assured, then, that when your own cup is likewise broken, you ought to be affected just as when another’s cup was broken. Now apply this to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is no one who would not say, This is an accident of mortality. But if any one’s own child happens to die, it is immediately, Alas ! how wretched am I! It should be always remembered how we are affected on hearing the same thing concerning others.

As a mark [*] is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the world.

If a person had delivered up your body to some passer-by, you would certainly be angry. And do

This chapter, except some very trifling differences, is the same with the fifteenth of the third book of the Discourses.-H.

Duties are universally measured by relations. Is a certain man your father? In this are implied, taking care of him; submitting to him in all things; patiently receiving his reproaches, his- correction. But he is a bad father. Is your natural tie, then, to a good father? No, but to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, preserve your own just relation towards him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do, to keep your own will in a state conformable to nature. For another cannot hurt you, unless you please. You will then be hurt when you consent to be hurt. In this manner, therefore, if you accustom yourself to contemplate the relations of neighbor, citizen, commander, you can deduce from each the corresponding duties.