Against Philon (26-30)

And this further point is worthy of your attention,—that whereas anyone who had betrayed a fort or a ship or an army which happened to have in it some part of our people, would be visited with the extreme penalty, this man, who has betrayed the whole city, is planning not merely to escape requital but even to obtain honor! But surely anyone who has betrayed liberty in the flagrant manner of this man deserves to be faced with a judgement awarding him, not a seat on the Council, but slavery and the heaviest punishment.

So, I suppose, if one should desert one’s post when the city itself was not in danger, but was rather endangering another people,[*] a law would have been made condemning that as a grievous crime; but if one deserted the city itself when the city itself was in danger, we should have had no law against this! Certainly we should, if there had been a thought that any of the citizens would ever commit such a crime.

Not a man but would have reason to rebuke you, gentlemen, if, after honoring in a manner worthy of the city our resident aliens for having supported the democracy beyond the requirements of their duty, you are not going to inflict on this man, for having betrayed the city in violation of his duty, if not some heavier punishment of another kind, at least the dishonor which you hold over him today.

Recall to your minds what reason you can have for honoring those who have proved themselves good servants of the State and for dishonoring those who serve her ill. In either case the distinction has been made not so much for the sake of those who have come into the world, as of those who are yet to come, in order that they may strive to become worthy by studious effort, and in no single direction may attempt to be base.