Defense Against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy (6-10)

I, however, hold that, just as it would be unfair, when some men have been the source of many benefits to the city, to let others carry off the reward of your honors or your thanks, so it is unreasonable, when some have continually done you harm, that their acts should bring reproach and slander upon those who have done no wrong. The city has enough enemies already existing, who count it a great gain to have people brought up on slanderous charges.

Now, first of all, you should reflect that no human being is naturally either an oligarch or a democrat: whatever constitution a man finds advantageous to himself, he is eager to see that one established; so it largely depends on you whether the present system finds an abundance of supporters. That this is the truth, you will have no difficulty in deducing from the events of the past.

For consider, gentlemen of the jury, how many times the leaders of both governments[*] changed sides. Did not Phrynichus, Peisander and their fellow demagogues, when they had committed many offences against you, proceed, in fear of the requital that they deserved, to establish the first oligarchy? And did not many of the Four Hundred, again, join in the return of the Peiraeus party, while some, on the other hand, who had helped in the expulsion of the Four Hundred, actually appeared among the Thirty? Some, too, of those who had enlisted for Eleusis marched out with you to besiege their own comrades!

There is thus no difficulty in concluding, gentlemen, that the questions dividing men are concerned, not with politics, but with their personal advantage. You should therefore apply this test in the probation of your citizens: examine their use of the citizenship under the democracy, and inquire whether they stood to benefit by a change in the government. In this way you will most justly form your decision upon them.