On A Wound By Premeditation (11-15)

also whether we went on receipt of a summons, or without invitation from anyone, and whether this man struck the first blow by assault, or I first hit him. Each of these points in turn, as of the rest, could have been cleared up with ease in every ease both for the public and for this court.

But he lies, and does not speak the truth. What a monstrous position it would be! To ransom my person from the enemy, I could make what use of her I pleased[*]; but when I am in danger of losing my native land, I am not to be permitted even to ask her for a true statement on the matters for which I have been brought to this trial. Nay, it would be far more just to have her tortured for the purpose of this charge than to have her sold for my ransom from the enemy, inasmuch as, if they are willing to take a ransom, one can get plenty of means elsewhere for obtaining one’s return; but if one is in the power of one’s adversaries, it is impossible. For they are not set on gaining money, but make it their business to expel one from one’s native land.

It is your duty, therefore, to reject his claim that the woman should not be tortured, which he made on the pretended ground of her freedom; you ought much rather to condemn him for slander, on the ground that he put aside so decisive a test in the expectation that he would easily deceive you.

For surely you should not regard his challenge as more convincing than ours, in regard to the points on which he claimed to have his own servants put to the torture. For as to their knowledge of our having gone to his house, we likewise admit that; but whether we were sent for or not, and whether I received the first blow or gave it, are things that she would be better able to know.