Greater Hippias (289-292)

Soc.

Very well I understand, Hippias, that the proper reply to him who asks these questions is this: Sir, you are not aware that the saying of Heracleitus is good, that Ôthe most beautiful of monkeys is ugly compared with the race of man,Õ and the most beautiful of pots is ugly compared with the race of maidens, as Hippias the wise man says. Is it not so, Hippias?

Hipp.

Certainly, Socrates; you replied rightly.

Soc.

Listen then. For I am sure that after this he will say: Yes, but, Socrates, if we compare maidens with gods,

will not the same thing happen to them that happened to pots when compared with maidens? Will not the most beautiful maiden appear ugly? Or does not Heracleitus, whom you cite, mean just this, that the wisest of men, if compared with a god, will appear a monkey, both in wisdom and in beauty and in everything else? Shall we agree, Hippias, that the most beautiful maiden is ugly if compared with the gods?

Hipp.

Yes, for who would deny that, Socrates?

Soc.

If, then, we agree to that, he will laugh and say: Socrates, do you remember the question you were asked? I do, I shall say, the question was what the absolute beautiful is. Then, he will say, when you were asked for the beautiful, do you give as your reply what is, as you yourself say, no more beautiful than ugly? So it seems, I shall say; or what do you, my friend, advise me to say?

Hipp.

That is what I advise; for, of course, in saying that the human race is not beautiful in comparison with gods, you will be speaking the truth.

Soc.

But if I had asked you, he will say, in the beginning what is beautiful and ugly,

if you had replied as you now do, would you not have replied correctly? But do you still think that the absolute beautiful, by the addition of which all other things are adorned and made to appear beautiful, when its form is added to any of them—do you think that is a maiden or a mare or a lyre?

Hipp.

Well, certainly, Socrates, if that is what he is looking for, nothing is easier than to answer and tell him what the beautiful is, by which all other things are adorned and by the addition of which they are made to appear beautiful.

So the fellow is very simple-minded and knows nothing about beautiful possessions. For if you reply to him: This that you ask about, the beautiful, is nothing else but gold, he will be thrown into confusion and will not attempt to confute you. For we all know, I fancy, that wherever this is added, even what before appears ugly will appear beautiful when adorned with gold.

Soc.

You don’t know the man, Hippias, what a wretch he is, and how certain not to accept anything easily.

Hipp.

What of that, then, Socrates? For he must perforce accept what is correct,

or if he does not accept it, be ridiculous.

Soc.

This reply, my most excellent friend, he not only will certainly not accept, but he will even jeer at me grossly and will say: You lunatic, do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman? And I shall say, Not in the least.

Hipp.

And you will be right, Socrates.

Soc.

Yes, to be sure. Consequently when I agree that Pheidias is a good craftsman,

Well, then, he will say, do you imagine that Pheidias did not know this beautiful that you speak of? Why do you ask that? I shall say. Because, he will say, he did not make the eyes of his Athena of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her hands and feet, if, that is, they were sure to appear most beautiful provided only they were made of gold, but he made them of ivory; evidently he made this mistake through ignorance, not knowing that it is gold which makes everything beautiful to which it is added. When he says that, what reply shall we make to him, Hippias?

Hipp.

That is easy; for we shall say that Pheidias did right; for ivory, I think, is beautiful.

Soc.

Why, then, he will say, did he not make the middle parts of the eyes also of ivory, but of stone, procuring stone as similar as possible to the ivory? Or is beautiful stone also beautiful? Shall we say that it is, Hippias?

Hipp.

Surely we shall say so, that is, where it is appropriate.

Soc.

But ugly when not appropriate? Shall I agree, or not?

Hipp.

Agree, that is, when it is not appropriate.

Soc.

What then? Do not gold and ivory, he will say, when they are appropriate, make things beautiful, and when they are not appropriate, ugly? Shall we deny that, or agree that what he says is correct?

Hipp.

We shall agree to this, at any rate, that whatever is appropriate to any particular thing makes that thing beautiful.

Soc.

Well, then, he will say, when some one has boiled the pot of which we were speaking just now, the beautiful one, full of beautiful soup, is a golden ladle appropriate to it, or one made of fig wood?

Hipp.

Heracles! What a fellow this is that you speak of!

Won’t you tell me who he is?

Soc.

You would not know him if I should tell you his name.

Hipp.

But even now I know that he is an ignoramus.

Soc.

He is a great nuisance, Hippias but yet, what shall we say? Which of the two ladles shall we say is appropriate to the soup and the pot? Is it not evidently the one of fig wood? For it is likely to make the soup smell better, and besides, my friend, it would not break the pot, thereby spilling the soup, putting out the fire, and making those who are to be entertained go without their splendid soup; whereas the golden ladle would do all those things,

so that it seems to me that we must say that the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one, unless you disagree.

Hipp.

No, for it is more appropriate, Socrates; however, I, for my part, would not talk with the fellow when he asks such questions.

Soc.

Quite right, my friend; for it would not be appropriate for you to be filled up with such words, you who are so beautifully clad, so beautifully shod, and so famous for your wisdom among all the Greeks; but for me it doesn’t matter if I do associate with the fellow;

so instruct me and for my sake answer him. For if the wooden one is more appropriate than the golden one, the fellow will say, would it not be more beautiful, since you agreed, Socrates, that the appropriate is more beautiful than that which is not appropriate? Shall we not agree, Hippias, that the wooden one is more beautiful than the golden?

Hipp.

Do you wish me to tell you, Socrates, what definition of the beautiful will enable you to free yourself from long discussion?

Soc.

Certainly; but not until after you have told me which of the two ladles I just spoke of I shall reply is appropriate and more beautiful.

Hipp.

Well, if you like, reply to him that it is the one made of fig wood.

Soc.

Now, then, say what you were just now going to say. For by this reply, if I say that the beautiful is gold, it seems to me that gold will be shown to be no more beautiful than fig wood; but what do you now, once more, say that the beautiful is?

Hipp.

I will tell you; for you seem to me to be seeking to reply that the beautiful is something of such sort that it will never appear ugly anywhere to anybody.

Soc.

Certainly, Hippias; now you understand beautifully.

Hipp.

Listen, then; for, mind you, if anyone has anything to say against this, you may say I know nothing at all.

Soc.

Then for Heaven’s sake, speak as quickly as you can.

Hipp.

I say, then, that for every man and everywhere it is most beautiful to be rich and healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to reach old age, and, after providing a beautiful funeral for his deceased parents,

to be beautifully and splendidly buried by his own offspring.

Soc.

Bravo, bravo, Hippias! You have spoken in a way that is wonderful and great and worthy of you; and now, by Hera, I thank you, because you are kindly coming to my assistance to the best of your ability. But our shots are not hitting the man; no, he will laugh at us now more than ever, be sure of that.

Hipp.

A wretched laugh, Socrates; for when he has nothing to say to this, but laughs, he will be laughing at himself

and will himself be laughed at by those present.

Soc.

Perhaps that is so perhaps, however, after this reply, he will, I foresee, be likely to do more than laugh at me.

Hipp.

Why do you say that, pray?

Soc.

Because, if he happens to have a stick, unless I get away in a hurry, he will try to fetch me a good one.

Hipp.

What? Is the fellow some sort of master of yours, and if he does that, will he not be arrested and have to pay for it? Or does your city disregard justice

and allow the citizens to beat one another unjustly?

Soc.

Oh no that is not allowed at all.

Hipp.

Then he will have to pay a penalty for beating you unjustly.

Soc.

I do not think so, Hippias. No, if I were to make that reply, the beating would be just, I think.

Hipp.

Then I think so, too, Socrates, since that is your own belief.

Soc.

Shall I, then, not tell you why it is my own belief that the beating would be just, if I made that reply? Or will you also beat me without trial? Or will you listen to what I have to say?

Hipp.

It would be shocking if I would not listen; but what have you to say?

Soc.

I will tell you, imitating him in the same way as a while ago, that I may not use to you such harsh and uncouth words as he uses to me. For you may be sure, Tell me, Socrates, he will say, do you think it would be unjust if you got a beating for singing such a long dithyramb so unmusically and so far from the question? How so? I shall say. How so? he will say; are you not able to remember that I asked for the absolute beautiful,

by which everything to which it is added has the property of being beautiful, both stone and stick and man and god and every act and every acquisition of knowledge? For what I am asking is this, man: what is absolute beauty? and I cannot make you hear what I say any more than if you were a stone sitting beside me, and a millstone at that, having neither ears nor brain. Would you, then, not be angry, Hippias,if I should be frightened and should reply in this way? Well, but Hippias said that this was the beautiful; and yet I asked him, just as you asked me, what is beautiful to all and always. What do you say? Will you not be angry if I say that?

Hipp.

I know very well, Socrates, that this which I said was beautiful is beautiful to all and will seem so.

Soc.

And will it be so, too he will say for the beautiful is always beautiful, is it not?

Hipp.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then was it so, too? he will say.

Hipp.

It was so, too.