Meno (97)

I mean that good men must be useful: we were right, were we not, in admitting that

Yes.

And in thinking that they will be useful if they give us right guidance in conduct: here also, I suppose, our admission was correct?

Yes.

But our assertion that it is impossible to give right guidance unless one has knowledge looks very like a mistake.

What do you mean by that?

I will tell you. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance?

Certainly.

Well, and a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, might give right guidance, might he not?

Certainly.

And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge.

Just as good.

Hence true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge; and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue,

So it seems.

Then right opinion is just as useful as knowledge.

With this difference, Socrates, that he who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not.

How do you mean? Will not he who always has right opinion be always right, so long as he opines rightly?

It appears to me that he must; and therefore I wonder, Socrates,

Well, do you know why it is that you wonder, or shall I tell you?

Please tell me.

It is because you have not observed with attention the images of Daedalus.[*] But perhaps there are none in your country.

What is the point of your remark?

That if they are not fastened up they play truant and run away; but, if fastened, they stay where they are.

Well, what of that?