Meno (95-99)

An.

Socrates, I consider you are too apt to speak ill of people. I, for one, if you will take my advice, would warn you to be careful: in most cities it is probably easier to do people harm than good, and particularly in this one;

I think you know that yourself.[*]

Soc.

Meno, I think Anytus is angry, and I am not at all surprised: for he conceives, in the first place, that I am speaking ill of these gentlemen; and in the second place, he considers he is one of them himself. Yet, should the day come when he knows what speaking ill means, his anger will cease; at present he does not know.[*] Now you must answer me: are there not good and honorable men among your people also?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

Well then, are they willing to put themselves forward as teachers of the young, and avow that they are teachers and that virtue is to be taught?

Men.

No, no, Socrates, I assure you: sometimes you may hear them refer to it as teachable, but sometimes as not.

Soc.

Then are we to call those persons teachers of this thing, when they do not even agree on that great question?

Men.

I should say not, Socrates.

Soc.

Well, and what of the sophists? Do you consider these, its only professors,

to be teachers of virtue?

Men.

That is a point, Socrates, for which I admire Gorgias: you will never hear him promising this, and he ridicules the others when he hears them promise it. Skill in speaking is what he takes it to be their business to produce.

Soc.

Then you do not think the sophists are teachers of virtue?

Men.

I cannot say, Socrates. I am in the same plight as the rest of the world: sometimes I think that they are, sometimes that they are not.

Soc.

And are you aware that not only you and other political folk

are in two minds as to whether virtue is to be taught, but Theognis the poet also says, you remember, the very same thing?

Men.

In which part of his poems?

Soc.

In those elegiac lines where he says—

Eat and drink with these men; sit with them, and he pleasing unto them, who wield great power; for from the good wilt thou win thee lessons in the good; but mingle with the bad,

and thou wilt lose even the sense that thou hast.

Theognis 33-36 BergkDo you observe how in these words he implies that virtue is to be taught?

Men.

He does, evidently.

Soc.

But in some other lines he shifts his ground a little, saying—

Could understanding be created and put into a man

Theognis 434-438 Bergk (I think it runs thus)

many high rewards would they obtain

for he would have followed the precepts of wisdom: but not by teaching wilt thou ever make the had man good

Bergk 434-438. You notice how in the second passage he contradicts himself on the same point?

Men.

Apparently.

Soc.

Well, can you name any other subject in which the professing teachers are not only refused recognition as teachers of others, but regarded as not even understanding it themselves,

and indeed as inferior in the very quality of which they claim to be teachers; while those who are themselves recognized as men of worth and honor say at one time that it is teachable, and at another that it is not? When people are so confused about this or that matter, can you say they are teachers in any proper sense of the word?

Men.

No, indeed, I cannot.

Soc.

Well, if neither the sophists nor the men who are themselves good and honorable are teachers of the subject, clearly no others can be?

Men.

I agree.

Soc.

And if there are no teachers, there can be no disciples either?

Men.

I think that statement is true.

Soc.

And we have admitted that a thing of which there are neither teachers nor disciples cannot be taught?

Men.

We have.

Soc.

So nowhere are any teachers of virtue to be found?

Men.

That is so.

Soc.

And if no teachers, then no disciples?

Men.

So it appears.

Soc.

Hence virtue cannot be taught?

Men.

It seems likely, if our investigation is correct. And that makes me wonder, I must say, Socrates, whether perhaps there are no good men at all, or by what possible sort of process good people can come to exist?

Soc.

I fear, Meno, you and I are but poor creatures, and Gorgias has been as faulty an educator of you as Prodicus of me. So our first duty is to look to ourselves, and try to find somebody who will have some means or other of making us better.

I say this with special reference to our recent inquiry, in which I see that we absurdly failed to note that it is not only through the guidance of knowledge that human conduct is right and good; and it is probably owing to this that we fail to perceive by what means good men can be produced.

Men.

To what are you alluding, Socrates?

Soc.

I mean that good men must be useful: we were right, were we not, in admitting that

this must needs be so?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

And in thinking that they will be useful if they give us right guidance in conduct: here also, I suppose, our admission was correct?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

But our assertion that it is impossible to give right guidance unless one has knowledge looks very like a mistake.

Men.

What do you mean by that?

Soc.

I will tell you. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or any other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not give right and good guidance?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

Well, and a person who had a right opinion as to which was the way, but had never been there and did not really know, might give right guidance, might he not?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

And so long, I presume, as he has right opinion about that which the other man really knows, he will be just as good a guide—if he thinks the truth instead of knowing it—as the man who has the knowledge.

Men.

Just as good.

Soc.

Hence true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge; and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue,

when we stated that knowledge is the only guide of right action; whereas we find there is also true opinion.

Men.

So it seems.

Soc.

Then right opinion is just as useful as knowledge.

Men.

With this difference, Socrates, that he who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not.

Soc.

How do you mean? Will not he who always has right opinion be always right, so long as he opines rightly?

Men.

It appears to me that he must; and therefore I wonder, Socrates,

this being the case, that knowledge should ever be more prized than right opinion, and why they should be two distinct and separate things.

Soc.

Well, do you know why it is that you wonder, or shall I tell you?

Men.

Please tell me.

Soc.

It is because you have not observed with attention the images of Daedalus.[*] But perhaps there are none in your country.

Men.

What is the point of your remark?

Soc.

That if they are not fastened up they play truant and run away; but, if fastened, they stay where they are.

Men.

Well, what of that?

Soc.

To possess one of his works which is let loose does not count for much in value; it will not stay with you any more than a runaway slave: but when fastened up it is worth a great deal, for his productions are very fine things And to what am I referring in all this? To true opinion. For these, so long as they stay with us, are a fine possession,

and effect all that is good; but they do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast with causal reasoning. And this process, friend Meno, is recollection, as in our previous talk we have agreed. But when once they are fastened, in the first place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion: the one transcends the other by its trammels.

Men.

Upon my word, Socrates, it seems to be very much as you say.

Soc.

And indeed I too speak as one who does not know but only conjectures: yet that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge is not at all a conjecture with me but something I would particularly assert that I knew: there are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know.

Men.

Yes, and you are right, Socrates, in so saying.

Soc.

Well, then, am I not right also in saying that true opinion leading the way renders the effect of each action as good as knowledge does?

Men.

There again, Socrates, I think you speak the truth.

Soc.

So that right opinion will be no whit inferior to knowledge in worth or usefulness as regards our actions, nor will the man who has right opinion be inferior to him who has knowledge.

Men.

That is so.

Soc.

And you know that the good man has been admitted by us to be useful.

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

Since then it is not only because of knowledge that men will be good and useful to their country, where such men are to be found, but also on account of right opinion; and since neither of these two things—knowledge

and true opinion—is a natural property of mankind, being acquired—or do you think that either of them is natural?

Men.

Not I.

Soc.

Then if they are not natural, good people cannot be good by nature either.

Men.

Of course not.

Soc.

And since they are not an effect of nature, we next considered whether virtue can be taught.

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

And we thought it teachable if virtue is wisdom?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

And if teachable, it must be wisdom?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

And if there were teachers, it could be taught,

but if there were none, it could not?

Men.

Quite so.

Soc.

But surely we acknowledged that it had no teachers?

Men.

That is true.

Soc.

Then we acknowledged it neither was taught nor was wisdom?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

But yet we admitted it was a good?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

And that which guides rightly is useful and good?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

And that there are only two things—

true opinion and knowledge—that guide rightly and a man guides rightly if he have these; for things that come about by chance do not occur through human guidance; but where a man is a guide to what is right we find these two things—true opinion and knowledge.

Men.

I agree.

Soc.

Well now, since virtue is not taught, we no longer take it to be knowledge?

Men.

Apparently not.

Soc.

So of two good and useful things one has been rejected: knowledge cannot be our guide in political conduct.

Men.

I think not.

Soc.

Therefore it was not by any wisdom, nor because they were wise, that the sort of men we spoke of controlled their states—Themistocles and the rest of them, to whom our friend Anytus was referring a moment ago. For this reason it was that they were unable to make others like unto themselves—because their qualities were not an effect of knowledge.

Men.

The case is probably as you say, Socrates.

Soc.

And if not by knowledge, as the only alternative it must have been by good opinion.

This is the means which statesmen employ for their direction of states, and they have nothing more to do with wisdom than soothsayers and diviners; for these people utter many a true thing when inspired, but have no knowledge of anything they say.

Men.

I daresay that is so.

Soc.

And may we, Meno, rightly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a great deed and word?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then we shall be right in calling those divine of whom

we spoke just now as soothsayers and prophets and all of the poetic turn; and especially we can say of the statesmen that they are divine and enraptured, as being inspired and possessed of God when they succeed in speaking many great things, while knowing nought of what they say.

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

And the women too, I presume, Meno, call good men divine; and the Spartans, when they eulogize a good man, say—He is a divine person.

Men.

And to all appearance, Socrates, they are right; though perhaps our friend Anytus may be annoyed at your statement.