Meno (87)

Soc.

I mean by hypothesis what the geometricians often do in dealing with a question put to them; for example,

whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangular space in a given circle: they reply—I cannot yet tell whether it has that capability; but I think, if I may put it so, that I have a certain helpful hypothesis for the problem, and it is as follows: If this area [*] is such that when you apply it to the given line[*] of the circle you find it falls short[*] by a space similar to that which you have just applied, then I take it you have one consequence, and if it is impossible for it to fall so, then some other. Accordingly I wish to put a hypothesis, before I state our conclusion as regards inscribing this figure in the circle by saying whether it is impossible or not. In the same way with regard to our question about virtue, since we do not know either what it is or what kind of thing it may be, we had best make use of a hypothesis in considering whether it can be taught or not, as thus: what kind of thing must virtue be in the class of mental properties, so as to be teachable or not? In the first place, if it is something dissimilar or similar to knowledge, is it taught or not—or, as we were saying just now, remembered? Let us have no disputing about the choice of a name: is it taught? Or is not this fact plain to everyone—that the one and only thing taught to men is knowledge?

Men.

I agree to that.

Soc.

Then if virtue is a kind of knowledge, clearly it must be taught?

Men.

Certainly.

Soc.

So you see we have made short work of this question—if virtue belongs to one class of things it is teachable, and if to another, it is not.

Men.

To be sure.

Soc.

The next question, it would seem, that we have to consider is whether virtue is knowledge, or of another kind than knowledge.

Men.

I should say that is the next thing we have to consider.

Soc.

Well now, surely we call virtue a good thing, do we not, and our hypothesis stands, that it is good?

Men.

Certainly we do.

Soc.

Then if there is some good apart and separable from knowledge, it may be that virtue is not a kind of knowledge; but if there is nothing good that is not embraced by knowledge, our suspicion that virtue is a kind of knowledge would be well founded.

Men.

Quite so.

Soc.

Now it is by virtue that we are good?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

And if good, profitable; for all good things are profitable, are they not?

Men.

Yes.

Soc.

So virtue is profitable?

Men.

That must follow from what has been admitted.

Soc.

Then let us see, in particular instances, what sort of things they are that profit us. Health, let us say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth—these and their like we call profitable, do we not?

Men.

Yes.