Meno (73)

And will virtue, as virtue, differ at all whether it be in a child or in an elderly person, in a woman or in a man?

I feel somehow, Socrates, that here we cease to be on the same ground as in those other cases.

Why? Were you not saying that a man’s virtue is to manage a state well, and a woman’s a house?

I was.

And is it possible to manage a state well, or a house, or anything at all, if you do not manage it temperately and justly?

Surely not.

Then whoever manages temperately and justly will manage with temperance and justice?

That must be.

Then both the woman and the man require the same qualities of justice and temperance, if they are to be good.

Evidently.

And what of a child or an old man? Can they ever hope to be good if they are intemperate and unjust?

Surely not.

Only if they are temperate and just?

Yes.

So all mankind are good in the same way; for they become good when they acquire the same qualities.

So it seems.

And I presume, if they had not the same virtue, they would not be good in the same way.

No, indeed.

Seeing then that it is the same virtue in all cases, try and tell me, if you can recollect, what Gorgias—and you in agreement with him—say it is.

Simply that it is the power of governing mankind—

That is just what I am after. But is virtue the same in a child, Meno, and in a slave—an ability to govern each his master? And do you think he who governed would still be a slave?

I should say certainly not, Socrates.

No, indeed, it would be unlikely, my excellent friend. And again, consider this further point: you say it is to be able to govern; shall we not add to that—justly, not unjustly?

Yes, I think so; for justice, Socrates, is virtue.

Virtue, Meno, or a virtue?

What do you mean by that?

What I would in any other case. To take roundness, for instance; I should call it a figure, and not figure pure and simple. And I should name it so because there are other figures as well.

You would be quite right—just as I say there are other virtues besides justice.