Gorgias (505)

Call.

Be it so.

Soc.

Because, I imagine, it is no gain for a man to live in a depraved state of body, since in this case his life must be a depraved one also. Or is not that the case?

Call.

Yes.

Soc.

And so the satisfaction of one’s desires—if one is hungry, eating as much as one likes, or if thirsty, drinking—is generally allowed by doctors when one is in health; but they practically never allow one in sickness to take one’s fill of things that one desires: do you agree with me in this?

Call.

I do.

Soc.

And does not the same rule, my excellent friend, apply to the soul? So long as it is in a bad state—thoughtless, licentious, unjust and unholy—we must restrain its desires and not permit it to do anything except what will help it to be better: do you grant this, or not?

Call.

I do.

Soc.

For thus, I take it, the soul itself is better off?

Call.

To be sure.

Soc.

And is restraining a person from what he desires correcting him?

Call.

Yes.

Soc.

Then correction is better for the soul than uncorrected licence, as you were thinking just now.

Call.

I have no notion what you are referring to, Socrates; do ask some one else.

Soc.

Here is a fellow who cannot endure a kindness done him, or the experience in himself of what our talk is about—a correction!

Call.

Well, and not a jot do I care, either, for anything you say; I only gave you those answers to oblige Gorgias.

Soc.

Very good. So now, what shall we do? Break off our argument midway?

Call.

You must decide that for yourself.

Soc.

Why, they say one does wrong to leave off even stories in the middle; one should set a head on the thing, that it may not go about headless. So proceed with the rest of your answers, that our argument may pick up a head.

Call.

How overbearing you are, Socrates! Take my advice, and let this argument drop, or find some one else to argue with.

Soc.

Then who else is willing? Surely we must not leave the argument there, unfinished?

Call.

Could you not get through it yourself, either talking on by yourself or answering your own questions?

Soc.

So that, in Epicharmus’s phrase,[*]

what two men spake erewhile

I may prove I can manage single-handed. And indeed it looks as though it must of sheer necessity be so. Still, if we are to do this, for my part I think we ought all to vie with each other in attempting a knowledge of what is true and what false in the matter of our argument; for it is a benefit to all alike that it be revealed.