Euthydemus (292)

Soc.

Then what would you say is its effect? For instance, if I were to ask you whether medicine, in ruling over all that comes under its rule, has any effect to show; would you not say: Yes, health?

Cri.

I would.

Soc.

And what about your art of agriculture? In ruling over all

that comes under its rule, what effect does it produce? Would you not say that it supplies us with food from the earth?

Cri.

I would.

Soc.

And what of the monarch’s art? In ruling over all that comes under its rule, what does it produce? Perhaps you are not quite ready with the answer.

Cri.

I am not indeed, Socrates.

Soc.

Nor were we, Crito; yet so much you know, that if this is really the one we are seeking, it must be beneficial.

Cri.

Certainly.

Soc.

Then surely it must purvey something good?

Cri.

Necessarily, Socrates.

Soc.

And you know we agreed with each other, Cleinias and I, that nothing can be good but some sort of knowledge.

Cri.

Yes, so you told me.

Soc.

And it was found that all effects in general that you may ascribe to statesmanship—and a great many of them there must be, presumably, if the citizens are to be made wealthy and free and immune from faction—all these things were neither bad nor good, while this art must make us wise and impart knowledge, if it really was to be the one which benefited us

and made us happy.

Cri.

True: so at all events you agreed then, by your account of the discussion.

Soc.

Then do you think that kingship makes men wise and good?

Cri.

Why not, Socrates?

Soc.

But does it make all men good, and in all things? And is this the art that confers every sort of knowledge—shoe-making and carpentry and so forth?

Cri.

No, I think not, Socrates.

Soc.

Well, what knowledge does it give ? What use can we make of it? It is not to be a producer of any of the effects which are neither bad nor good, while it is to confer no other knowledge but itself. Shall we try and say what it is, and what use we shall make of it? Do you mind if we describe it, Crito, as that whereby we shall make other men good?

Cri.

I quite agree.

Soc.

And in what respect are we going to have these men good, and in what useful? Or shall we venture to say they are to make others so, and these again others? In what respect they can possibly be good is nowhere evident to us,

since we have discredited all the business commonly called politics, and it is merely a case of the proverbial Corinthus Divine[*]; and, as I was saying, we are equally or even worse at fault as to what that knowledge can be which is to make us happy.

Cri.

Upon my word, Socrates, you got yourselves there, it seems, into a pretty fix.