Euthydemus (286)

Soc.

proceeded the other, he said, asked Ctesippus: he said, He agreed. he asked, This also he admitted. [*] At this Ctesippus was silent; but I, wondering at the argument, said: How do you mean, Dionysodorus? For, to be plain with you, this argument, though I have heard it from many people on various occasions, never fails to set me wondering—you know the followers of Protagoras made great use of it, as did others even before his time, but to me it always seems to have a wonderful way of upsetting not merely other views but itself also—and I believe I shall learn the truth of it from you far better than from anyone else. There is no such thing as speaking false—that is the substance of your statement, is it not? Either one must speak and speak the truth, or else not speak? He agreed. Then shall we say that speaking false is not, but thinking false is? he said. So neither is there any false opinion, I said, at all. he said. Nor ignorance, nor ignorant men; or must not ignorance occur, if it ever can, when we put things falsely? he said. But there is no such thing as this, I said. he said. Is it merely to save your statement, Dionysodorus, that you state it so—just to say something startling—or is it really and truly your view that there is no such thing as an ignorant man? he replied, Well, does your argument allow of such a thing as refutation, if there is nobody to speak false? said Euthydemus. So neither did Dionysodorus just now bid me refute him? I asked. Well, Euthydemus, I said, it is because I do not at all understand these clever devices and palpable hits: I am only a dull sort of thinker. And so I may perhaps be going to say something rather clownish; but you must forgive me.