Lysis (217)

Then only what is neither good nor bad proves to be friendly to the good,

and to that only. Then can we rely further on this present statement, my boys, I said, as a sure guide? For instance, we have only to consider a body in health to see that it has no need of doctoring or assistance: it is well enough as it is, and so no one in health is friend to a doctor, on account of his health. You agree? But the sick man is, I imagine, on account of his disease. Now disease is a bad thing, and medicine is beneficial and good. And a body, of course, taken as body, is neither good nor bad. But a body is compelled by disease to welcome and love medicine. Thus what is neither bad nor good becomes a friend of the good because of the presence of evil. But clearly this must be before it is itself made evil by the evil which it has; for surely, when once it has been made evil, it can no longer have any desire or love for the good; since we agreed it was impossible for bad to be a friend of good. Now observe what I say. Some things are of the same sort as those that are present with them, and some are not. For example, if you chose to dye something a certain color, the substance of the dye is present, I presume, with the thing dyed. Then is the thing dyed of the same sort, in point of color, as the substance that is added? he said. Well, try it this way, I went on: suppose some one tinged your golden locks with white lead, would they then be or appear to be white? he replied. And, in fact, whiteness would be present with them? But all the same they would not be any the more white as yet; for though whiteness be present, they are not at all white, any more than they are at all black. But when, my dear boy, old age has cast that same color upon them, they have then come to be of the same sort as that which is present—white through presence of white. So this is the question I have been trying to put to you—whether a thing that has something present with it is to be held of the same sort as that present thing or only when that thing is present in a particular way, but otherwise not? he said. So that what is neither bad nor good is sometimes, when bad is present, not bad as yet, and such cases have been known to occur. When therefore it is not bad as yet, though bad is present, this presence makes it desire good; but the presence which makes it bad deprives it equally of its desire and its love for the good.