Laches (190-193)

Soc.

If we happen to know

that sight joined to eyes makes those eyes the better for it, and further if we are able to get it joined to eyes, we obviously know what this faculty of sight is, on which we might be consulting as to how it might be best and most easily acquired. For if we did not know first of all what sight or hearing is, we should hardly prove ourselves consultants or physicians of credit in the matter of eyes or ears, and the best way of acquiring sight or hearing.

Lach.

Truly spoken, Socrates.

Soc.

And you know, Laches, at this moment our two friends are inviting us to a consultation as to the way in which virtue may be joined to their sons’ souls, and so make them better?

Lach.

Yes, indeed,

Soc.

Then our first requisite is to know what virtue [*] is? For surely, if we had no idea at all what virtue actually is, we could not possibly consult

with anyone as to how he might best acquire it?

Lach.

I certainly think not, Socrates.

Soc.

Then we say, Laches, that we know what it is.

Lach.

I suppose we must.

Soc.

And of that which we know, I presume, we can also say what it is.

Lach.

To be sure.

Soc.

Let us not, therefore, my good friend, inquire forthwith about the whole of virtue, since that may well be too much for us; but let us first see ifwe are sufficiently provided with knowledge about some part of it.

In all likelihood this will make our inquiry easier.

Lach.

Yes, let us do as you propose, Socrates.

Soc.

Then which of the parts of virtue shall we choose? Clearly, I think, that which the art of fighting in armor is supposed to promote; and that, of course, is generally supposed to be courage, is it not?

Lach.

Yes, it generally is, to be sure.

Soc.

Then let our first endeavor be, Laches, to say what courage is: after that we can proceed to inquire in what way our young men may obtain it,

in so far as it is to be obtained by means of pursuits and studies. Come, try and tell me, as I suggest, what is courage.

Lach.

On my word, Socrates, that is nothing difficult: anyone who is willing to stay at his post and face the enemy, and does not run away, you may be sure, is courageous.

Soc.

Rightly spoken, Laches; but I fear I am to blame, by not putting it clearly, for your having answered not the intention of my question, but something else.

Lach.

What do you mean by that, Socrates?

Soc.

I will explain, so far as I can: let us take that man to be courageous who, as you describe him yourself, stays at his post and fights the enemy.

Lach.

I, for one, agree to that.

Soc.

Yes, and I do too. But what of this other kind of man, who fights the enemy while fleeing, and not staying?

Lach.

How fleeing?

Soc.

Well, as the Scythians are said to fight, as much fleeing as pursuing; and as you know Homer says in praise of Aeneas’ horses, that they knew

how to pursue and to flee in fright full swiftly this way and that way;

Hom. Il. 8.107-108 and he glorifies Aeneas himself for this very knowledge of fright, calling him

prompter of fright.

Hom. Il. 8.107-108 [*]

Lach.

And very properly too, Socrates; for he was speaking of chariots; and so are you speaking of the mode of the Scythian horsemen. That is the way of cavalry fighting but with men-at-arms it is as I state it. [*]

Soc.

Except, perhaps, Laches, in the case of the Spartans.

For they say that at Plataea, when the Spartans came up to the men with wicker shields, they were not willing to stand and fight against these, but fled; when, however, the Persian ranks weree broken, the Spartans kept turning round and fighting like cavalry, and so won that great battle. [*]

Lach.

What you say is true.

Soc.

And so this is what I meant just now by sayng that I was to blame for your wrong answer, by putting my question wrongly.

For I wanted to have your view not only of brave men-at-arms, but also of courage in cavalry and in the entire warrior class; and of the courageous not only in war but in the perils of the sea, and all who in disease and poverty, or again in public affairs, are courageous; and further, all who are not merely courageous against pain or fear, but doughty fighters against desires and pleasures, whether standing their ground or turning back upon the foe—for I take it, Laches, there are courageous people in all these kinds.

Lach.

Very much so, Socrates.

Soc.

Then all these are courageous, only some have acquired courage in pleasures, some in pains, some in desires and some in fears, while others, I conceive, have acquired cowardice in these same things.

Lach.

To be sure.

Soc.

What either of them [*] is—that is what I wanted to know. So try again, and tell me first what is this thing, courage, which is the same in all of these cases; or do you still not comprehend my meaning?

Lach.

Not very well.

Soc.

I mean in this way: suppose, for instance, I were asking you what is quickness, as we find it in running and harping, in speaking and learning, and in many other activities, and as possessed by us practically in any action worth mentioning, whether of arms or legs, or mouth or voice, or mind: or do you not use the word so?

Lach.

Yes, to be sure.

Soc.

Well then, suppose someone asked me: Socrates, what do you mean by this thing which in all cases you term quickness?

My reply would be: The faculty that gets a great deal done in a little time is what I call quickness, whether in a voice or in a race or in any of the other instances.

Lach.

Your statement would be quite correct.

Soc.

So now try and tell me on your part, Laches, about courage in the same way: what faculty is it, the same whether in pleasure or in pain or in any of the things in which we said just now it was to be found, that has been singled out by the name of courage?

Lach.

Well then, I take it to be a certain endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the natural quality that appears in them all.

Soc.

Why, of course we must, if we are each to answer the other’s actual question. Now it appears to me that by no means all endurance, as I conceive it, can appear to you to be courage. And my grounds for thinking so are these: I am almost certain, Laches, that you rank courage among the nobler qualities.

Lach.

Nay, among the noblest, you may be quite certain.

Soc.

And endurance joined with wisdom is noble and good?

Lach.

Very much so.

Soc.

But what of it when joined with folly? Is it not, on the contrary, hurtful and mischievous?

Lach.

Yes.

Soc.

And can you say that such a thing is noble, when it is both mischievous and hurtful?

Lach.

Not with any justice, Socrates.

Soc.

Then you will not admit that such an endurance is courage, seeing that it is not noble, whereas courage is a noble quality.

Lach.

That is true.

Soc.

So, by your account, wise endurance will be courage.

Lach.

Apparently.

Soc.

Now let us see in what it is wise. In all things, whether great or small? For instance, if a man endures in spending money wisely, because he knows that by spending he will gain more, would you call him courageous?

Lach.

On my word, not I.

Soc.

Or what do you call it in the case of a doctor who, when his son or anyone else is suffering from inflammation of the lungs and begs for something to drink or eat, inflexibly and enduringly refuses?

Lach.

That is no case of it, in any sense, either.

Soc.

Well now, when a man endures in war, and is willing to fight, on a wise calculation whereby he knows that others will come to his aid, and that the forces against him will be fewer and feebler than those who are with him, and when he has besides the advantage of position,—would you say of this man, if he endures with such wisdom and preparation, that he, or a man in the opposing army who is willing to stand up against him and endure, is the more courageous?

Lach.

The man opposed to him, I should say, Socrates.

Soc.

But yet his endurance is more foolish than that of the first man.

Lach.

That is true.

Soc.

So you would say that he who in a cavalry fight endures with a knowledge of horsemanship is less courageous than he who endures without it.

Lach.

Yes, I think so.

Soc.

And he who endures with a skill in slinging or shooting or other such art.

Lach.

To be sure.

Soc.

And anyone who agrees to descend into a well, and to dive, and to endure in this or other such action, without being an adept in these things, you would say is more courageous than the adepts.

Lach.

Yes, for what else can one say, Socrates?

Soc.

Nothing, provided one thinks so.

Lach.

But I do think it.

Soc.

And you observe, I suppose, Laches, that persons of this sort are more foolish in their risks and endurances than those who do it with proper skill.

Lach.

Evidently.

Soc.

Now, we found before that foolish boldness and endurance are base and hurtful?

Lach.

Quite so.

Soc.

But courage was admitted to be something noble.

Lach.

Yes, it was.

Soc.

Whereas now, on the contrary, we say that this base thing—foolish endurance—is courage.

Lach.

Apparently.

Soc.

Then do you think our statement is correct?

Lach.

On my word, Socrates, not I.

Soc.

Hence I presume that, on your showing, you and I, Laches,

are not tuned to the Dorian harmony: for our deeds do not accord with our words. By our deeds, most likely, the world might judge us to have our share of courage, but not by our words, I fancy, if they should hear the way we are talking now.

Lach.

That is very true.

Soc.

Well now, does it seem right that we should be in such a condition?

Lach.

Not by any means.

Soc.

Then do you mind if we accept our statement to a certain point?

Lach.

To what point do you mean, and what statement?