Hipparchus (229-230)

Soc. There are two such inscriptions of his: on the left side of each Hermes there is one in which the god says that he stands in the midst of the city or the township, while on the right side he says:

The memorial of Hipparchus: walk with just intent.

There are many other fine inscriptions from his poems on other figures of Hermes, and this one in particular, on the Steiria [*] road, in which he says:

The memorial of Hipparchus: deceive not a friend.

I therefore should never dare, I am sure, to deceive you, who are my friend, or disobey the great Hipparchus, after whose death the Athenians were for three years under the despotic rule of his brother Hippias, and you might have heard anyone of the earlier period say that it was only in these years that there was despotism in Athens, [*] and that at all other times the Athenians lived very much as in the reign of Cronos. And the subtler sort of people say that Hipparchus’s death was due, not to the cause supposed by most—the disqualification of the assassin’s sister from bearing the basket, [*] for that is a silly motive—but because Harmodius had become the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him. Thus Aristogeiton also prided himself on educating people, and he regarded Hipparchus as a dangerous rival. And at that time, it is said, Harmodius happened to be himself in love with one of the handsome and well-born youths of the day; they do tell his name, but I cannot remember it. Well, for a while this youth admired both Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, when he associated with Hipparchus, he despised them, and they were so overcome with the pain of this “disqualification” that they slew Hipparchus. [*]

Fr. It would seem, then, Socrates, either that you do not regard me as your friend, or if you do, that you do not obey Hipparchus. For that you are not deceiving me—though I cannot tell how you contrive it—in your talk, is more than I can believe.

Soc. Well now, as though we were playing draughts, I am willing to let you revoke, as you please, anything you have said in carrying on the discussion, in order that you may not think you are being deceived. So tell me, shall I revoke for you the statement that all men desire good things?

Fr. No, thank you.

Soc. Well, that suffering loss, or loss, is an evil?

Fr. No, thank you.

Soc. Well, that gain, or making gain, is the opposite of loss, or suffering loss?

Fr. Nor that either.

Soc. Well, that making gain, as the opposite of evil, is a good?

Fr. Nothing of all this do I bid you revoke for me.

Soc. You think, then, it seems, that some gain is good, and some evil.

Fr. I do.

Soc. Well then, I revoke so much for you; so let us assume that some gain is good, and some other gain evil. But the good sort is no more gain than the evil sort, is it?

Fr. What do you mean by this question?

Soc. I will explain. Is there both good and evil food?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And is the one sort more food than the other, or are they both similarly this same thing, food, and in this respect does the one differ no wise from the other, in being food, but only in the fact of the one being good and the other evil?

Fr. Yes.

Soc. And so with drink and every other class of things that exist, when some things in any class come to be good, and others evil, one thing does not differ from another in that respect whereby they are the same? For instance, one man, I suppose, is virtuous, and another wicked.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. But neither of them, I conceive, is more or less man than the other—neither the virtuous than the wicked, nor the wicked than the virtuous.

Fr. What you say is true.

Soc. Then are we to take the same view of gain also, that both the wicked and the virtuous sort are similarly gain?

Fr. Necessarily.

Soc. So he who has virtuous gain is no whit the more a gainer than he who has wicked gain: neither sort is found to be more gain, as we agree.

Fr. Yes.

Soc. For neither of them has addition of either more or less.

Fr. No, indeed.

Soc. And how could one do or suffer anything more or less with a thing of this sort, that had neither of these additions?

Fr. Impossible.

Soc. Since, therefore, both of these are gains and gain-making affairs, we must now consider what it can be that leads you to call both of them gain: what is it that you see to be the same in both? Suppose you were to ask me, in those instances that I gave just now, what it is that leads me to call both good food and evil food alike food, I should tell you— for this reason, because both are a dry sustenance of the body. For that, I am sure you would agree, is what food is, would you not?

Fr. I would.