Alcibiades 2 (144-145)

Soc. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend, and ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself, but did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?

Alc. No, upon my word, I should think not.

Soc. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?

Alc. I do not think he would.

Soc. For presumably he, too, had no intention of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else’s mother, but only his own.

Alc. That is so.

Soc. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.

Alc. It seems to be.

Soc. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.

Alc. What may that be, Socrates?

Soc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing we so confidently intend to say or do?

Alc. I think so.

Soc. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors; and in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Then observe the consequence.

Alc. If I am able.

Soc. Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And the many unwise, and the few wise?

Alc. Precisely.

Soc. And in either case you name them in reference to something?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war?

Alc. Agreed.

Soc. Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?

Alc. No, to be sure.

Soc. Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the useful, is it not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think?

Alc. I agree.

Soc. And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport, or do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?

Alc. I do.

Soc. And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines, [*] I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference?

Alc. No, it is as you say.

Soc. Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man, or shall we say he comes far short of it?

Alc. Far short of it, I declare.

Soc. Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better to employ their respective arts?