Alcibiades 1 (130-132)

Soc. And the user of it must be the soul?

Alc. It must.

Soc. And ruler?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Now, here is a remark from which no one, I think, can dissent.

Alc. What is it?

Soc. That man must be one of three things.

Alc. What things?

Soc. Soul, body, or both together as one whole.

Alc. Very well.

Soc. But yet we have admitted that what actually rules the body is man?

Alc. We have.

Soc. And does the body rule itself?

Alc. By no means.

Soc. Because we have said that it is ruled.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then that cannot be what we are seeking.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. Well then, does the combination of the two rule the body, so that we are to regard this as man?

Alc. Perhaps it is.

Soc. The unlikeliest thing in the world: for if one of the two does not share in the rule, it is quite inconceivable that the combination of the two can be ruling.

Alc. You are right.

Soc. But since neither the body nor the combination of the two is man, we are reduced, I suppose, to this: either man is nothing at all, or if something, he turns out to be nothing else than soul.

Alc. Precisely so.

Soc. Well, do you require some yet clearer proof that the soul is man?

Alc. No, I assure you: I think it is amply proved.

Soc. And if it is tolerably, though not exactly, we are content; exact knowledge will be ours later, when we have discovered the thing that we passed over just now because it would involve much consideration.

Alc. What is that?

Soc. The point suggested in that remark a moment ago, [*] that we should first consider the same-in-itself; but so far, instead of the same, we have been considering what each single thing is in itself. And perhaps we shall be satisfied with that: for surely we cannot say that anything has more absolute possession of ourselves than the soul.

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And it is proper to take the view that you and I are conversing with each other, while we make use of words, by intercourse of soul with soul?

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Well, that is just what we suggested a little while ago—that Socrates, in using words to talk with Alcibiades, is holding speech, not with your face, it would seem, but with Alcibiades—that is, with his soul.

Alc. I believe so.

Soc. Then he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul.

Alc. So it seems.

Soc. And anyone who gets to know something belonging to the body knows the things that are his, but not himself.

Alc. That is so.

Soc. Then no physician, in so far as he is a physician, knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. And farmers, and craftsmen generally, are far from knowing themselves. For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended.

Alc. That is true.

Soc. So if knowing oneself is temperance, none of these people is temperate in respect of his art.

Alc. None, I agree.

Soc. And that is why these arts are held to be sordid, and no acquirements for a good man.

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Then once again, whoever tends his body tends his own things, but not himself?

Alc. It looks rather like it.

Soc. But whoever tends his money tends neither himself nor his own things, but only things yet more remote than his own things?

Alc. I agree.

Soc. So that the money-maker has ceased to do his own business.

Alc. Correct.

Soc. And if anyone is found to be a lover of Alcibiades’ body, he has fallen in love, not with Alcibiades, but with something belonging to Alcibiades?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. Your lover is rather he who loves your soul?

Alc. He must be, apparently, by our argument.

Soc. And he who loves your body quits you, and is gone, as soon as its bloom is over?

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Whereas he who loves your soul will not quit you so long as it makes for what is better?

Alc. So it seems.

Soc. And I am he who does not quit you, but remains with you when your body’s prime is over, and the rest have departed.

Alc. Yes, and I am glad of it, Socrates, and hope you will not go.

Soc. Then you must endeavor to be as handsome as you can.

Alc. Well, I shall endeavor.

Soc. You see how you stand: Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, it seems, neither had nor has any lover except one only, and that a cherished one, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

Alc. True.

Soc. And you said that I only just anticipated you in coming to you, for otherwise you would have come to me first for the purpose of inquiring why I am the only one who does not leave you?

Alc. Yes, that was so.

Soc. Then the reason was that I was the only lover of you, whereas the rest were lovers of what is yours; and that is losing its charm, while you are beginning to bloom. So now, if you are not blighted and deformed by the Athenian people, I shall never forsake you. For my chiefest fear is of your being blighted by becoming a lover of the people, since many a good Athenian has come to that ere now. For fair of face is

the people of great-hearted Erechtheus;

Hom. Il. 2.547 but you should get a view of it stripped: so take the precaution that I recommend.

Alc. What is it?

Soc. Exercise yourself first, my wonderful friend, in learning what you ought to know before entering on politics; you must wait till you have learnt, in order that you may be armed with an antidote and so come to no harm.

Alc. Your advice seems to me good, Socrates; but try to explain in what way we can take pains over ourselves.

Soc. Well, we have made one step in advance; for there is a pretty fair agreement now as to what we are, whereas we were afraid we might fail of this and take pains, without knowing it, over something other than ourselves.

Alc. That is so.

Soc. And the next step, we see, is to take care of the soul, and look to that.

Alc. Clearly.

Soc. While handing over to others the care of our bodies and our coffers.

Alc. Quite so.

Soc. Then how shall we obtain the most certain knowledge of it? For if we know that, it seems we shall know ourselves also. In Heaven’s name, do we fail to comprehend the wise words of the Delphic inscription, which we mentioned just now?

Alc. With what intent do you say that, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the real advice which the inscription gives us. I rather think there are not many illustrations of it to be found, but only in the case of sight.

Alc. What do you mean by that?

Soc. Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye of one of us, as a piece of advice See thyself, how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at that by looking at which it would see itself?

Alc. Clearly.

Soc. Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.

Alc. Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.

Soc. Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?

Alc. To be sure.