Alcibiades 1 (123-127)

Soc. so that one can be pretty sure that those people are the richest of the Greeks in gold and silver, and that among themselves the richest is the king; for the largest and most numerous receipts of the kind are those of the kings, and besides there is the levy of the royal tribute in no slight amount, which the Spartans pay to their kings. Now, the Spartan fortunes, though great compared with the wealth of other Greeks, are nought beside that of the Persians and their king. For I myself was once told by a trustworthy person, who had been up to their court, that he traversed a very large tract of excellent land, nearly a day’s journey, which the inhabitants called the girdle of the king’s wife, and another which was similarly called her veil; and many other fine and fertile regions reserved for the adornment of the consort; and each of these regions was named after some part of her apparel. So I imagine, if someone should say to the king’s mother Amestris, who was wife of Xerxes, The son of Deinomache [*] intends to challenge your son; the mother’s dresses are worth perhaps fifty minae at the outside, while the son has under three hundred acres at Erchiae, [*] she would wonder to what on earth this Alcibiades could be trusting, that he proposed to contend against Artaxerxes; and I expect she would remark—The only possible things that the man can be trusting to for his enterprise are industry and wisdom; for these are the only things of any account among the Greeks. Whereas if she were informed that this Alcibiades who is actually making such an attempt is, in the first place, as yet barely twenty years old, and secondly, altogether uneducated; and further, that when his lover tells him that he must first learn, and take pains over himself, and practise, before he enters on a contest with the king, he refuses, and says he will do very well as he is; I expect she would ask in surprise, On what, then, can the youngster rely? And if we told her, On beauty, stature, birth, wealth, and mental gifts, she would conclude we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages of her own people in all these respects.

Soc. And I imagine that even Lampido, daughter of Leotychides and wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, who have all been kings, would wonder in the same way, when she compared her people’s resources, at your intention of having a contest with her son despite your bad upbringing. And yet, does it not strike you as disgraceful that our enemies’ wives should have a better idea of the qualities that we need for an attempt against them than we have ourselves? Ah, my remarkable friend, listen to me and the Delphic motto, Know thyself; for these people are our competitors, not those whom you think; and there is nothing that will give us ascendancy over them save only pains and skill. If you are found wanting in these, you will be found wanting also in achievement of renown among Greeks and barbarians both; and of this I observe you to be more enamored than anyone else ever was of anything.

Alc. Well then, what are the pains that I must take, Socrates? Can you enlighten me? For I must say your words are remarkably like the truth.

Soc. Yes, I can: but we must put our heads together, [*] you know, as to the way in which we can improve ourselves to the utmost. For observe that when I speak of the need of being educated I am not referring only to you, apart from myself; since my case is identical with yours except in one point.

Alc. What is that ?

Soc. My guardian is better and wiser than your one, Pericles.

Alc. Who is he, Socrates?

Soc. God, Alcibiades, who until this day would not let me converse with you; and trusting in him I say that through no other man but me will you attain to eminence.

Alc. You are jesting, Socrates.

Soc. Perhaps; I am right, however, in saying that we need to take pains—all men rather badly, but we two very badly indeed.

Alc. As to me, you are not wrong.

Soc. Nor, I fear, as to myself either.

Alc. Then what can we do?

Soc. There must be no crying off or skulking, my good friend.

Alc. No, for that would indeed be unseemly, Socrates.

Soc. It would; so let us consider in common. Now tell me: we say, do we not, that we wish to be as good as possible?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. In what excellence?

Alc. Clearly that which is the aim of good men.

Soc. Good in what?

Alc. Clearly, good in the management of affairs.

Soc. What sort of affairs? Horsemanship?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Because we should apply to horsemen?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Well, seamanship, do you mean?

Alc. No.

Soc. Because we should apply to seamen?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Well, what sort of thing? The business of what men?

Alc. Of Athenian gentlemen.

Soc. Do you mean by gentlemen the intelligent or the unintelligent?

Alc. The intelligent.

Soc. And everyone is good in that wherein he is intelligent?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And bad wherein he is unintelligent?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. Then is the shoemaker intelligent in the making of foot-gear?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. So he is good in that article?

Alc. Good.

Soc. Well now, is not the shoemaker unintelligent in the making of clothes?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. So he is bad in that?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Then, on this showing, the same man is both bad and good.

Alc. Apparently.

Soc. Well, can you say that good men are also bad?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. But whoever do you mean by the good?

Alc. I mean those who are able to rule in the city.

Soc. Not, I presume, over horses?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. But over men?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. When they are sick?

Alc. No.

Soc. Or at sea?

Alc. I say, no.

Soc. Or harvesting?

Alc. No.

Soc. Doing nothing, or doing something?

Alc. Doing something, I say.

Soc. Doing what? Try and let me know.

Alc. Well, men who do business with each other and make use of one another, as is our way of life in our cities.

Soc. Then you speak of ruling over men who make use of men?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Over boatswains who make use of rowers?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Because that is the pilot’s distinction?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Well, do you mean ruling over men who are flute-players, and who lead the singing and make use of dancers?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Because, again, that is the chorus-teacher’s function?

Alc. To be sure.

Soc. But whatever do you mean by being able to rule over men who make use of men?

Alc. I mean ruling over men in the city who share in it as fellow-citizens, and do business with each other.

Soc. Well, what art is this? Suppose I should ask you over again, as I did just now, what art makes men know how to rule over fellow-sailors?

Alc. The pilot’s.

Soc. And what knowledge—to repeat what was said a moment ago—makes them rule over their fellow-singers?

Alc. That which you just mentioned, the chorus-teacher’s.

Soc. Well now, what do you call the knowledge of one’s fellow-citizens?

Alc. Good counsel, I should say, Socrates.

Soc. Well, and is the pilot’s knowledge evil counsel?

Alc. No, no.

Soc. Rather good counsel?

Alc. So I should think, for the preservation of his passengers.

Soc. Quite right. And now, for what is the good counsel of which you speak?

Alc. For the better management and preservation of the city.

Soc. And what is it that becomes present or absent when we get this better management and preservation? If, for example, you should ask me, What is it that becomes present or absent when the body is better managed and preserved?—I should reply, Health becomes present, and disease absent. Do not you think so too?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And if, again, you asked me, What becomes present in a better condition of the eyes?—I should answer in just the same way, Sight becomes present, and blindness absent. So, in the case of the ears, deafness is caused to be absent, and hearing to be present, when they are improved and getting better treatment.

Alc. Correct.

Soc. Well then, what is it that becomes present or absent when a state is improved and has better treatment and management?

Alc. To my mind, Socrates, friendship with one another will be there, while hatred and faction will be absent.

Soc. Now, by friendship do you mean agreement or disagreement?

Alc. Agreement.

Soc. And what art is it that causes states to agree about numbers?

Alc. Arithmetic.

Soc. And what of individuals? Is it not the same art?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And it makes each single person agree with himself?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And what art makes each of us agree with himself as to which is the longer, a span or a cubit? Is it not mensuration?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. And it makes both individuals and states agree with each other?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And what about the balance? Is it not the same here too?

Alc. It is.

Soc. Then what is that agreement of which you speak, and about what? And what art secures it? And is it the same in an individual as in a state, when one agrees with oneself and with another?

Alc. Most likely.

Soc. Well, what is it? Do not flag in your answers, but do your best to tell me.

Alc. I suppose I mean the friendship and agreement that you find when a father and mother love their son, and between brother and brother, and husband and wife.

Soc. Then do you suppose, Alcibiades, that a husband can possibly agree with his wife about woolwork, when he does not understand it, and she does?

Alc. Oh, no.

Soc. Nor has he any need, since that is a woman’s pursuit.

Alc. Yes.

Soc. Or again, could a woman agree with a man about soldiering, when she has not learnt it?

Alc. Oh, no.

Soc. Because, I expect you will say again, that is a man’s affair.

Alc. I would.

Soc. Then, by your account, there are some pursuits belonging to women, and some to men?

Alc. Of course.

Soc. So in these, at any rate, there is no agreement between men and women.

Alc. No.

Soc. And hence no friendship either, if, as we said, friendship is agreement.

Alc. Apparently not.

Soc. So women are not loved by men, in so far as they do their own work.

Alc. It seems not.

Soc. Nor are men by women, in so far as they do theirs.

Alc. No.

Soc. And states, therefore, are not well ordered in so far as each person does his own business? [*]

Alc. I think they are, Socrates.

Soc. How can you say that? Without the presence of friendship, which we say must be there if states are well ordered, as otherwise they are not?

Alc. But it seems to me that friendship arises among them just on that account—that each of the two parties does its own business.

Soc. It was not so a moment since: but now, what do you mean this time? Does friendship arise where there is no agreement? And is it possible that agreement should arise where some know about the business, but others do not?

Alc. Impossible.

Soc. And are they doing what is just or unjust, when each man does his own business?

Alc. What is just, of course.

Soc. And when the citizens do what is just in the city, does not friendship arise among them?

Alc. Again I think that must be so, Socrates.

Soc. Then whatever do you mean by that friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and well-advised in order that we may be good men? For I am unable to learn either what it is, or in whom; since it appears that the same persons sometimes have it, and sometimes not, by your account.

Alc. Well, by Heaven, Socrates, I do not even know what I mean myself, and I fear that for some time past I have lived unawares in a disgraceful condition.

Soc. But you must take heart. For had you perceived your plight at fifty, it would be hard for you to take pains with yourself; whereas here you are at the time of life when one ought to perceive it.

Alc. Then what should one do on perceiving it, Socrates?

Soc. Answer the questions asked, Alcibiades: only do that, and with Heaven’s favor—if we are to put any trust in my divination—you and I shall both be in better case.

Alc. That shall be, so far as my answering can avail.