Alcibiades 1 (118-120)

Soc. But since it is neither those who know, nor those of the ignorant who know that they do not know, the only people left, I think, are those who do not know, but think that they do?

Alc. Yes, only those.

Soc. Then this ignorance is a cause of evils, and is the discreditable sort of stupidity?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And when it is about the greatest matters, it is most injurious and base?

Alc. By far.

Soc. Well then, can you mention any greater things than the just, the noble, the good, and the expedient?

Alc. No, indeed.

Soc. And it is about these, you say, that you are bewildered?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. But if you are bewildered, is it not clear from what has gone before that you are not only ignorant of the greatest things, but while not knowing them you think that you do?

Alc. I am afraid so.

Soc. Alack then, Alcibiades, for the plight you are in! I shrink indeed from giving it a name, but still, as we are alone, let me speak out. You are wedded to stupidity, my fine friend, of the vilest kind; you are impeached of this by your own words, out of your own mouth; and this, it seems, is why you dash into politics before you have been educated. And you are not alone in this plight, but you share it with most of those who manage our city’s affairs, except just a few, and perhaps your guardian, Pericles.

Alc. Yes, you know, Socrates, they say he did not get his wisdom independently, but consorted with many wise men, such as Pythocleides [*] and Anaxagoras [*]; and now, old as he is, he still confers with Damon [*] for that very purpose.

Soc. Well, but did you ever find a man who was wise in anything and yet unable to make another man wise in the same things as himself? For instance, the man who taught you letters was wise himself, and also made you wise, and anyone else he wished to, did he not?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And you too, who learnt from him, will be able to make another man wise?

Alc. Yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the harper and the trainer?

Alc. Certainly.

Soc. For, I presume, it is a fine proof of one’s knowing anything that one knows, when one is able to point to another man whom one has made to know it.

Alc. I agree.

Soc. Well then, can you tell me whom Pericles made wise? One of his sons, to begin with?

Alc. But what if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, Socrates?

Soc. Well, Cleinias, your brother.

Alc. But why should you mention Cleinias, a madman?

Soc. Well, if Cleinias is mad and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason are we to assign, in your case, for his allowing you to be in your present condition?

Alc. I believe I am myself to blame for not attending to him.

Soc. But tell me of any other Athenian or foreigner, slave or freeman, who is accounted to have become wiser through converse with Pericles; as I can tell you that Pythodorus [*] son of Isolochus, and Callias, [*] son of Calliades, became through that of Zeno [*]; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae, [*] and has become both wise and distinguished.

Alc. Well, upon my word, I cannot.

Soc. Very good: then what is your intention regarding yourself? Will you remain as you are, or take some trouble?

Alc. We must put our heads together, Socrates. And indeed, as soon as you speak, I take the point and agree. For the men who manage the city’s affairs, apart from a few, do strike me as uneducated.

Soc. Then what does that mean?

Alc. That if they were educated, I suppose anyone who undertook to contend against them would have to get some knowledge and practice first, as he would for a match with athletes: but now, seeing that these men have gone in for politics as amateurs, what need is there for me to practise and have the trouble of learning? For I am sure that my natural powers alone will give me an easy victory over them.

Soc. Ho, ho, my good sir, what a thing to say! How unworthy of your looks and your other advantages!

Alc. What is your meaning now, Socrates? What is the connection?

Soc. I am grieved for you, and for my love.

Alc. Why, pray?

Soc. That you should expect your contest to be with the men we have here.

Alc. Well, but with whom is it to be?

Soc. Is that a worthy question to be asked by a man who considers himself high-spirited?

Alc. How do you mean? Is not my contest with these men?

Soc. Well, suppose you were intending to steer a warship into action, would you be content to be the best hand among the crew at steering or, while regarding this skill as a necessary qualification, would you keep your eye on your actual opponents in the fight, and not, as now, on your fellow-fighters? These, I conceive, you ought so far to surpass that they would not feel fit to be your opponents, but only to be your despised fellow-fighters against the enemy, if you mean really to make your mark with some noble action that will be worthy both of yourself and of the city.

Alc. Why, I do mean to.

Soc. So you think it quite fitting for you to be satisfied if you are better than the soldiers, but neglect to keep your eye on the enemy’s leaders with a view to showing yourself better than they are, or to plan and practise against them!

Alc. Of whom are you speaking now, Socrates?

Soc. Do you not know that our city makes war occasionally on the Spartans and on the Great King?

Alc. That is true.

Soc. And if you are minded to be the head of our state, you would be right in thinking that your contest is with the kings of Sparta and of Persia?

Alc. That sounds like the truth.

Soc. No, my good friend; you ought rather to keep your eye on Meidias the quail-filliper [*] and others of his sort—who undertake to manage the city’s affairs, while they still have the slavish hair [*] (as the women would say) showing in their minds through their lack of culture, and have not yet got rid of it; who, moreover, have come with their outlandish speech to flatter the state, not to rule it—to these, I tell you, should your eyes be turned; and then you can disregard yourself, and need neither learn what is to be learnt for the great contest in which you are to be engaged, nor practise what requires practice, and so ensure that you are perfectly prepared before entering upon a political career.

Alc. Why, Socrates, I believe you are right; though I think neither the Spartan generals nor the Persian king are at all different from other people.

Soc. But, my excellent friend, consider what this notion of yours means.

Alc. In regard to what?

Soc. First of all, do you think you would take more pains over yourself if you feared them and thought them terrible, or if you did not?

Alc. Clearly, if I thought them terrible.

Soc. And do you think you will come to any harm by taking pains over yourself?

Alc. By no means; rather that I shall get much benefit.

Soc. And on this single count that notion [*] of yours is so much to the bad.

Alc. True.

Soc. Then, in the second place, observe the probability that it is false.

Alc. How so?

Soc. Is it probable that noble races should produce better natures, or not?

Alc. Clearly, noble races would.

Soc. And will not the well-born, provided they are well brought up, probably be perfected in virtue?

Alc. That must be so.

Soc. Then let us consider, by comparing our lot with theirs, whether the Spartan and Persian kings appear to be of inferior birth. Do we not know that the former are descendants of Hercules and the latter of Achaemenes, and that the line of Hercules and the line of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?