Philebus (30-31)

Soc. Well, is this next one worth asking? What will you say to it?

Pro. What is it?

Soc. Shall we not say that our body has a soul?

Pro. Clearly we shall.

Soc. Where did it get it, Protarchus, unless the body of the universe had a soul, since that body has the same elements as ours, only in every way superior?

Pro. Clearly it could get it from no other source.

Soc. No; for we surely do not believe, Protarchus, that of those four elements, the finite, the infinite, the combination, and the element of cause which exists in all things, this last, which gives to our bodies souls and the art of physical exercise and medical treatment when the body is ill, and which is in general a composing and healing power, is called the sum of all wisdom, and yet, while these same elements exist in the entire heaven and in great parts thereof, and area moreover, fair and pure, there is no means of including among them that nature which is the fairest and most precious of all.

Pro. Certainly there would be no sense in that.

Soc. Then if that is not the case, it would be better to follow the other line of thought and say, as we have often said, that there is in the universe a plentiful infinite and a sufficient limit, and in addition a by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may most justly be called wisdom and mind.

Pro. Yes, most justly.

Soc. Surely reason and mind could never come into being without soul.

Pro. No, never.

Soc. Then in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind were implanted through the power of the cause, and in other deities other noble qualities from which they derive their favorite epithets.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Now do not imagine, Protarchus, that this is mere idle talk of mine; it confirms the utterances of those who declared of old [*] that mind always rules the universe.

Pro. Yes, certainly.

Soc. And to my question it has furnished the reply that mind belongs to that one of our four classes which was called the cause of all. Now, you see, you have at last my answer.

Pro. Yes, and a very sufficient one and yet you answered without my knowing it.

Soc. Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a restful change from serious talk.

Pro. You are right.

Soc. We have now, then, my friend, pretty clearly shown to what class mind belongs and what power it possesses.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And likewise the class of pleasure was made clear some time ago.

Pro. Yes, it was.

Soc. Let us, then, remember concerning both of them that mind was akin to cause and belonged more or less to that class, and that pleasure was itself infinite and belonged to the class which, in and by itself, has not and never will have either beginning or middle or end.

Pro. We will remember that, of course.

Soc. Our next task is to see in what and by means of what feeling each of them comes into being whenever they do come into being. We will take pleasure first and discuss these questions in relation to pleasure, as we examined its class first. But we cannot examine pleasure successfully apart from pain.

Pro. If that is our proper path, let us follow it.

Soc. Do you agree with us about the origin of pleasure?

Pro. What do you think it is?

Soc. I think pain and pleasure naturally originate in the combined class.

Pro. Please, my dear Socrates, remind us which of the aforesaid classes you mean by the combined class.

Soc. I will do so, as well as I can, my brilliant friend.

Pro. Thank you.

Soc. By combined class, then, let us understand that which we said was the third of the four.

Pro. The one you mentioned after the infinite and the finite, and in which you put health and also, I believe, harmony?

Soc. You are quite right. Now please pay very close attention.

Pro. I will. Say on.

Soc. I say, then, that when, in us living beings, harmony is broken up, a disruption of nature and a generation of pain also take place at the same moment.

Pro. What you say is very likely.

Soc. But if harmony is recomposed and returns to its own nature, then I say that pleasure is generated, if I may speak in the fewest and briefest words about matters of the highest import.

Pro. I think you are right, Socrates; but let us try to be more explicit.

Soc. It is easiest to understand common and obvious examples, is it not?

Pro. What examples?

Soc. Is hunger a kind of breaking up and a pain?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And eating, which is a filling up again, is a pleasure?

Pro. Yes.