Parmenides (163)

And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one.

True.

Then in moving, the one changes in nature.

Yes.

And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way.

No.

Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change.

True.

Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change.

So it appears.

And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?

That is inevitable.

Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes.

Quite true.

Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different.

Yes, we should do that.

We ask, then, if the one is not, what will be the consequences in regard to it?

Yes.

Does the expression is not denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?

No, nothing else.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression is not mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?

Without any qualifications whatsoever.

Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence.

No.

But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence.

No, nothing else.

But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it.

Of course not.

Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all.

That is reasonable.

Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence.

No; that is clear.

Then it is not changed in nature at all; for such change involves coming into being and perishing.

True.

And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?

Certainly not.

And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same.

Yes, of course, the same place.

Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion.

No, neither.