Parmenides (161-165)

It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor that, is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all; [*] but if non-existence is the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of that and of many other attributes.

Yes, certainly.

And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind.

Yes.

And are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind?

Of course.

And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not?

Yes, they are unlike.

Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it.

Evidently.

Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike.

So it appears.

But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself?

How is that?

If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one.

Certainly.

But that is inadmissible.

It certainly is.

Then the one must possess likeness to itself.

It must.

And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of which are impossible, if one does not exist.

Yes, they are impossible.

And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it, can they?

Certainly not.

And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not?

Yes.

And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is unequal to them?

Of course.

Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others are unequal to it?

Yes, it does.

But greatness and smallness are constituents of inequality.

Yes.

Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness?

So it appears.

Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another.

Certainly.

Then there is always something between them.

There is.

Can you think of anything between them except equality?

No, only equality.

Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two.

That is clear.

Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and greatness and smallness.

So it appears.

And it must also, in a way, partake of existence.

How is that?

It must be in such conditions as we have been saying; for if it were not, we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right?

You are.

Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, we necessarily assert that we say that which is.

Necessarily.

Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non-existent, but gives up something of being to not-being, [*] then it will be existent.

Certainly.

Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence. For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent, thus assuring its own perfect existence, and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-existent also secures its perfect non-existence.

Very true.

Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily partakes of existence to attain non-existence.

Yes, necessarily.

Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence.

Clearly.

And non-existence also, if it does not exist.

Of course.

Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that condition without changing from it?

No, it cannot.

Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change.

Of course.

But change is motion; we agree to that?

It is motion.

And did we not see that the one is and is not?

Yes.

Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition.

So it appears.

And we have seen that the non-existent one has motion, since it changes from being to not-being.

There is not much doubt of that.

But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another.

Of course not.

Then its motion cannot be change of place.

No, it cannot.

Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any existent thing.

No, it is impossible.

Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not.

No.

And the one, whether existent or non-existent, cannot change into something other than itself; for if it changed into something other than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about something else.

Quite right.

But if it neither changes into something else, nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way?

No how can it?

But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest.

Yes, it must.

Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion.

So it appears.

And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no longer in its former condition, but in a different one.

True.

Then in moving, the one changes in nature.

Yes.

And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its nature in any way.

No.

Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so far as it does not move, it does not change.

True.

Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change.

So it appears.

And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?

That is inevitable.

Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes.

Quite true.

Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different.

Yes, we should do that.

We ask, then, if the one is not, what will be the consequences in regard to it?

Yes.

Does the expression is not denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?

No, nothing else.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression is not mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?

Without any qualifications whatsoever.

Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way partake of existence.

No.

But were coming into being and perishing anything else than receiving and losing existence.

No, nothing else.

But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor lose it.

Of course not.

Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or lose or share in existence at all.

That is reasonable.

Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being, since it participates in no way in existence.

No; that is clear.

Then it is not changed in nature at all; for such change involves coming into being and perishing.

True.

And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?

Certainly not.

And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same.

Yes, of course, the same place.

Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at rest nor in motion.

No, neither.

Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence.

That is plain.

Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it.

No.

Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things.

Clearly not.

And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it?

Impossible.

Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different.

No.

Well, then, will the notions of that or to that or some, or this or of this or of another or to another or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent?

No.

Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever.

It appears to have none whatsoever.

Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist.

Let us do so.

Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others.

True.

But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?

Yes, I do.

And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other?

Yes.

Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others.

Yes, there must be.

Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist.

No.

Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing.

True.

They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist. But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it.

Very true.

Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist.

Certainly.

There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist?

Yes.

And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many.

Certainly.

And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist.

True.

And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions.

Of course.

And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality.

That is reasonable.

And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?

Why is that?

Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist.

Very true.

So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one.

Certainly.

Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right?

That is perfectly conclusive.

Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not.

Yes, they must.

And will they not also appear to be like and unlike?

Why?

Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike.

Certainly.

But when you come close to them they appear to be many and different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in kind and unlike each other.

Yes.

And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.

Certainly.

And also the same and different, and in contact with one another and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest, and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, if the many exist and the one does not.

Very true.

Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not.

Let us do so.

Well, the others will not be one?

Of course not.

Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many.

True.

If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

No.