Parmenides (159)

And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another.

Yes.

But opposites are as unlike as possible.

To be sure.

Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike.

Yes, that must be true.

Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another.

So they are.

And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things which are other than one experience all the opposite affections.

You are right.

Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have said, and there is no alternative.

Certainly.

Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must happen to the things which are other than one.

By all means.

Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from the one?

Why is that?

Because there is nothing else besides these, which is other than one and other than the others. For when we have said one and the others we have included all things.

Yes, all things.

Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one and the others may be.

No.

Then the one and the others can never be in the same.

Apparently not.

Then they are separate?

Yes.

And surely we say that what is truly one has no parts.

How can it have parts?

Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts.

Of course not.

Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole.

No, apparently not.

The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in themselves any unity.

No.

But neither are the others many; for if they were many, each of them would be one part of the whole; but actually the things that are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they do not participate in the one in any way.

Right.

Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them, if they are entirely deprived of unity.

True.

Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor are likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not even partake of one.

Impossible.