Parmenides (157)

And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes? When it changes from being to destruction or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed?

Yes, so it appears.

And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimilation; and in passing from small to great and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality.

Apparently not.

All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists.

Yes, certainly.

Must we not consider what is likely to happen to the other things, if the one exists?

We must.

Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one, if one exists?

Let us do so.

Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the one for if they were, they would not be other than the one.

True.

And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way.

In what way?

Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.

True.

But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole.

Yes, we affirm that they do.

But the whole must be one composed of many and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole.

How is that?

If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs.

That is clear.

Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all this it is of which the part is a part.

Certainly.

If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one.

True.

Then the things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts.

Yes, they must.