Parmenides (153)

I cannot tell.

But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are more than one and have multitude.

Yes, they have.

And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one.

Of course.

Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the greater or the smaller numbers?

The smaller.

Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it not?

Yes.

The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other.

They have.

And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things.

Yes, they would.

Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

It is impossible.

But surely the one was shown to have parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.

Yes.

And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike—comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not?

Certainly.

And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.

Yes, we shall say that.

The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being; so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.

That is clear.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.

I think that is clear, too.

Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part?

It must.

Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being.

True.