Parmenides (150)

These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not?

For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things.

That is obvious.

Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it.

Necessarily.

What if it be in the whole of one?

Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?

Clearly.

And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?

No, it cannot.

Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it.

Yes.

And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist.

Inevitably.

Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness.

So it appears.

Nor will greatness exist in the one. For in that case, something other than absolute greatness and differing from it, namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere.

True.

But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but absolute greatness.

No.

Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Evidently not.

Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.

Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality, and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.

And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.

The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others.

Evidently.