On the Murder of Herodes (91-95)

Indeed, supposing that you were bound to make some mistake, it would be less of an outrage to acquit me unfairly than to put me to death without just cause; for the one thing is a mistake and nothing more: the other is a sin in addition. You must exercise the greatest caution in what you do, because you will not be able to reconsider your action. In a matter which admits of reconsideration a mistake, whether made through giving rein to the feelings or through accepting a distorted account of the facts, is not so serious; it is still possible to change one’s mind and come to a right decision. But when reconsideration is impossible, the wrong done is only increased by altering one’s mind and acknowledging one’s mistake. Some of you yourselves have in fact repented before now of having sent men to their death; but when you, who had been misled, felt repentance, most assuredly did those who had misled you deserve death.

Moreover, whereas involuntary mistakes are excusable, voluntary mistakes are not; for an involuntary mistake is due to chance, gentlemen, a voluntary one to the will. And what could be more voluntary than the immediate putting into effect of a carefully considered course of action? Furthermore, the wrongful taking of life by one’s vote is just as criminal as the wrongful taking of life by one’s hand.

Rest assured that I should never have come to Athens, had such a crime been on my conscience. I am here, as it is, because I have faith in justice, the most precious ally of the man who has no deed of sin upon his conscience and who has committed no transgression against the gods. Often at such an hour as this, when the body has given up the struggle, its salvation is the spirit, which is ready to fight on in the conscience that it is innocent. On the other hand, he whose conscience is guilty has no worse enemy than that conscience; for his spirit fails him which his body is still unwearied, because it feels that what is approaching him is the punishment of his iniquities. But it is with no such guilty conscience that I come before you.

There is nothing remarkable in the fact that the prosecution are misrepresenting me. It is expected of them just as it is expected of you not to consent to do what is wrong. I say this because if you follow my advice, it is still open to you to regret your action, and that regret can be remedied by punishing me at the second trial: whereas if you obediently carry out the prosecution’s wishes, the situation cannot be righted again. Nor is there a question of a long interval before the law will allow you to take the step to which the prosecution are today urging you to consent in defiance of it. It is not haste, but discretion which triumphs; so take cognizance of the case today: pass judgement on it later[*]; form an opinion as to the truth today: decide upon it later.

It is very easy, remember, to give false evidence against a man on a capital charge. If you are persuaded only for an instant to put him to death, he has lost his chance of redress with his life. A man’s very friends will refuse to seek redress for him once he is dead; and even if they are prepared to do so, what good is it to one who has lost his life?