On the Estate of Hagnias (10-14)

But we—that is to say, Stratius, Stratocles, and myself—since the estate had now become adjudicable to the next-of-kin,[*] all prepared to bring a suit. However, before the hearing of the case, Stratius and Stratocles both died; and thus I am the only surviving relative on the father's side, being the son of a cousin and the only person to whom, according to the law, the estate could pass, all the other relatives having died who possessed the same degree of kinship as myself.

But, it may be asked, how are you to know that I possess the rights of a next-of-kin, while the children of the other cousins, including this child, did not possess them? The law itself will make this clear. It is universally admitted that the rights as next-of-kin belong to cousins on the father's side, including their children, but the point which we have now to examine whether the law grants these rights to our children also. Take, therefore, the law and read it to the court.

Law [If there is no relative on the father's side as far as the degree of the children of cousins, then the right of inheritance passes to the mother's side in the same order of succession.]

Mark you, gentlemen, the legislator did not say that, in default of heirs on the father's side up to the degree of cousin's children, the rights descend to the latter's children; no, in default of us[*], he gives the inheritance to the relatives of the deceased on his mother's side, namely, to brothers and sisters and their children, and so on, in the same order as was laid down before. But he has placed our children outside the right of succession. How, then, can those to whom, even if I were dead, the law does not award Hagnias's estate, imagine that, while I am alive and have a legal right to the property, they themselves can have any title as next-of-kin? Their claim is quite preposterous.

Indeed, if the right of succession is not possessed by those whose fathers stood in the same degree of relationship as myself, neither is it possessed by this child; for his father stood in the same degree as they. Is it not, therefore, outrageous, that, whereas the laws have thus explicitly given me the right of inheritance and have placed my opponents outside the requisite degree of kinship, this fellow should dare to play these pettifogging tricks and, at the moment when I was laying claim to the estate, should think fit, not to bring an action against me and pay the necessary deposit—this being the proper moment to have the question settled, if his claims were well-founded—but to annoy me in the name of this child and make me run the most serious risks?

His charge is not concerned[*] with money which admittedly belongs to the child, nor can he say that I have received any such money—if I had administered any property in the manner in which he has done, I should deserve to be prosecuted; no, in bringing this kind of suit he has designs upon property which you, after permitting anyone who wished to dispute my claim to it, assigned by your verdict to me. Such is the extent of his impudence.