On the Estate of Menecles (40-44)

It is clear, I think, to you all that it was acknowledged even by my opponents themselves that Menecles was not insane but that it is much rather my opponent who is insane now, seeing that, after having effected a settlement of his quarrel with us and having sworn oaths, he has now again come forward in violation of his acknowledgements and oaths, and demands that I shall be deprived of these poor remnants of the estate.

Were it not that I think it an altogether base and shameful act to betray him whose son was called and who adopted me, I would have readily abandoned the right of succession to his estate in favor of my opponent; for there is nothing at all left, as I think you realize.

But, in the circumstances, I consider it terrible and disgraceful that, when Menecles possessed property, I accepted adoption as his son and out of his property, before the land was sold, acted as gymnasiarch[*] in his deme and won credit as his son, and served in his tribe and deme on all the campaigns which took place during that period;

and, now that he is dead, if I shall betray him and go off leaving his house desolate, would it not seem a strange and ridiculous proceeding, and give those who wish to do so a good occasion to speak evil of me? And these are not the only motives which induce me to fight this case; but what grieves me is the possibility of being thought so worthless and good-for-nothing as not to be able to find a friend in his right senses, but only a madman, to adopt me.

I beg you all therefore, gentlemen, and beseech and entreat you to pity me and to acquit the witness here. I have shown you that, in the first place, I was adopted by Menecles with the strictest possible legality, and that the form of adoption was not merely verbal or by will but by very act and deed; and of these things I produced before you the evidence of the wardsmen, the demesmen, and the members of the confraternity.