Exordia (51.1-53.1)

I should have thought, men of Athens, that no one who has a clean conscience about the measures taken would prefer a complaint against those who move to bring these matters to an accounting; for the more often one examines into them, the more the authors of them are bound to grow in esteem. These men themselves, however, seem to me to render it manifest that they have not acted with the State’s interests in view. At any rate, just as if they were bound to be found guilty if they should come again to an accounting, they assume the defensive and say we are acting outrageously. And yet when you accuse of outrageous conduct those who wish to investigate, what are we citizens to say of those who in that very transaction have perpetrated a fraud against our own selves?

It would be the righteous thing, men of Athens, for you to feel the same anger toward those who attempt to deceive you as toward those who have been able to do so. For what it was in the power of these men to do has been done, and they led you along. That these designs have fallen short of success, credit is due to Fortune and to the fact that you are now wiser than when you were misled by these men. Yet the State, I believe, is so far from being able to exact justice of the wrongdoers, that it seems to me you must content yourselves if you shall be able to avoid sustaining loss; so formidable are the trickeries and chicaneries and, not to particularize, certain salaried public services[*] that have been organized against you. To denounce the villainy of these men, however, would not at this juncture be most opportune: but I do wish to say what I deem advantageous with reference to the matters I have risen to discuss.

The bickering and disorder, men of Athens, that are accustomed to injure the State all the time, have proceeded on this occasion from the same men as always. But the thing to do is not so much to blame these men—for perhaps they do it out of spite and quarrelsomeness and, what is the chief reason, because it pays them to do so—as to blame yourselves, men of Athens, if, after assembling on matters of common interest and prime importance, you sit and listen to private bickerings and cannot figure out for yourselves that the tirades directed against one another by all the speakers, when no one is on trial, cause you to pay the penalties for the offences of which they convict one another.