Apollodorus Against Callippus (26-30)

Ah, but he will say perhaps, that my father got some private profit out of the money, and therefore took sides with Cephisiades rather than with the plaintiff. Then we are to believe, in the first place, that he wronged a man who would be able to do him injury to twice the amount of his gains, and secondly that my father in this instance was a base lover of gain, whereas in regard to special taxes and public services and gifts to the state he was not.

And did he, who never wronged a stranger, wrong Callippus? And did the plaintiff, as he alleges, tender an oath to my father as to one who was a worthy man and would tell no falsehood, and yet does he now speak of him as a base fellow, who erases records of deposits? And, if my father refused to take the oath, as the plaintiff claims, or to make payment, how could he have escaped immediate condemnation? Who can believe this, men of the jury? I certainly think no one can.

And has Archebiades forsooth sunk to such an extreme of baseness as to testify against Callippus, a fellow-demesman of his own, one in public life, and an official, and to say that I am telling the truth while Callippus is lying, and all this, when he knows that, if Callippus chooses to proceed against him for false testimony, or to do no more than put him on oath, he will be compelled to take whatever oath Callippus may require?

And again, can anyone persuade you that Archebiades would perjure himself in order that Cephisiades, a resident alien, might get the money, or Phormion either, a man whom Callippus charges with having expunged some records of deposit? It is not a probable thing, men of the jury. Nor is it right to judge either Archebiades or my father guilty of any act of baseness; you know that my father was too emulous of honor to indulge in any base or shameful practices, and that his relations with Callippus were not such as to lead him through contempt to do him an injury.

Callippus indeed does not appear to me to be a man of such slight importance as to be treated with contempt—a man of such influence that last year, after he had instituted this action against me, and had challenged me to refer the matter to Lysitheides for arbitration (and I, although scorned by him, yet took wise counsel in this at any rate—I made the reference in due legal form, and carried the matter before the magistrate), Callippus, I say, induced the arbitrator, who had been designated according to the laws, to pronounce his award without taking oath, although I protested that he should give it on oath as the laws ordain, his purpose being that he might be able to say before you, that Lysitheides, a good and worthy man, had already given a decision regarding the matters at issue.