One of the Sons of Aristaechmus Against Nausimachus and Xenopeithes (20-22)

For my own part, I think that the large sum asked as damages in the suits then brought is a stronger proof for us, that our father was the victim of a malicious action, than for them, that they were being defrauded of a large estate. For if he could prove his claims for eighty talents, no man in the world would have accepted three talents in settlement; whereas anyone, being defendant in a guardianship suit involving such large sums, would have paid three talents to buy off the risk and the advantages with which at that time nature supplied these men. They were orphans and young, and you were ignorant of their real characters; and everyone says that in your courts these things have more weight than strong arguments.

Moreover, I think I can also prove that you might with good reason refuse to hear a word from them in regard to the guardianship.[*] For suppose one should grant that they have suffered the greatest possible wrongs, and that everything which they will now allege about these matters is true, this, at least, I presume you would all admit: that it has happened to others ere now to have suffered many wrongs more serious than pecuniary wrongs. For involuntary homicides, outrages on what is sacred, and many other such crimes are committed; yet in all these cases the fact they have yielded to persuasion and given a release is appointed for the parties wronged as a limit and settlement of the dispute.

And this just principle is so binding among all men, that, if one, having convicted another of involuntary homicide, and clearly shown him to be polluted, subsequently takes pity upon him, and releases him, he has no longer the right to have the same person driven into exile. If, then, when life and all that is most precious are at stake, a release has this power and validity, shall it be without effect, when money is at stake, or claims of lesser importance? Surely not. For the thing most to be feared is, not that I should fail to obtain justice in your court, but that a just practice, established from the beginning of time, should now be done away with.