Nicobulus Against Pantaenetus (56-60)

But what is to come of it? If I lend money to so-and-so, am I for this reason also to lose my suit? Surely not. The plaintiff cannot point out any baseness or villainy attaching to me, nor does a single one among you, many as you are, know any such thing against me. As to these other qualities, each one of us, I take it, is as nature happened to make him; and to fight against nature, when one has these characteristics, is no easy task (for otherwise we should not differ from one another); though to recognize them in looking on another and to criticize them is easy.

But which one of these qualities has any bearing on my dispute with you, Pantaenetus? You have suffered many grievous wrongs? Well, you have had satisfaction. Not from me? No; for you were not wronged in any way by me. Otherwise you would never have given me the release, nor, when you were making up your mind to bring suit against Evergus, would you have passed me by; nor would you have demanded that one who had done you many grievous wrongs should undertake to be vendor of the property. Besides, how could I have wronged you, when I was not present or even in the country?

Well then, suppose[*] one should grant that Pantaenetus has suffered the greatest possible wrongs, and that everything which he will now allege about these matters is true, this, at least, I presume, you would all admit: that it has happened to others ere now to have suffered many wrongs more serious than pecuniary wrongs. For involuntary homicides, outrages on what is sacred, and many other such crimes are committed; yet in all these cases the fact that they have yielded to persuasion and given a release is appointed for the parties wronged as a limit and settlement of the dispute.

And this just principle is so binding among all men, that if anyone having convicted another of involuntary homicide, and clearly shown him to be polluted,[*] subsequently takes pity on him and releases him, he has no longer the right to have the same person driven into exile. Again, if the victim himself before his death releases the murderer from bloodguiltiness, it is not lawful for any of the remaining kinsmen to prosecute; but those whom the laws sentence to banishment and exile and death, upon conviction, if they are once released, are by that word freed from all evil consequences.

If, then, when life and all that is most precious are at stake, a release has this power and validity, shall it be without effect when money is at stake, or claims of lesser importance? Surely not. For the thing most to be feared is, not that I should fail to obtain justice in your court, but that you should now in our day do away with a just practice, established from the beginning of time.