Against Timocrates (189-191)

On the other hand, if you say that you legislated for the general good, you must not plead the payment made by these men,—it has nothing to do with your law,—you must prove that the law itself is acceptable and well conceived. That is the motive you allege; that is what I deny, and have therefore indicted you; that is the issue which the jury is to decide.—I should, indeed, have no difficulty in proving that respect for law is by no means the reason why these persons have paid their debt; but as that is not the question on which the jury have to vote, why trouble them by discussing it now?

He will not, I suppose, spare you the argument that it would be very hard on him to be punished for proposing that no Athenian citizen shall be sent to jail; and that it is for the benefit more especially of people without influence that laws should be as merciful and humane as possible. To avoid being led astray, you will do well to listen to a brief rejoinder to that plea.

For when he uses the phrase, that no Athenian citizen shall be sent to jail, do not forget that he is lying. That is not his proposal; it is that you jurors shall lose your control over penalties. He is trying to establish the right of appeal against a verdict returned on oath, after argument and trial. Do not let him pick out of his law and read a few phrases that have a benevolent sound to the ear let him produce the whole statute, clause by clause, and allow you to consider its effects. You will find that it is what I describe, not what he pretends.