Against Meidias (26-30)

But of one thing I am perfectly certain, and you should be equally so-that if I had not lodged the public plaint but had brought a civil action, the opposite argument would have been used against me, that if there was any truth in my statements, I ought to have lodged a public plaint and claimed redress at the time when the offences were committed; for the chorus was a state-chorus, the apparel was being prepared entirely for a public festival, and I, the aggrieved party, was official chorus-master. Who then would dream of any other form of redress than that which the law provides against those who profane a festival?

I am sure that he would have said all that in those circumstances. For it is, I believe, the cue for the defendant, the man who has done a wrong, to try and shuffle out of the method actually adopted to bring him to punishment and to say that a different method should have been employed; but it is the duty of sensible jurymen to ignore such evasions and to chastise anyone whom they convict of an outrage.

Do not allow him to say that the law affords me a choice of personal suits or an indictment for assault. That is true; but he has to prove that he has not done what I have charged him with, or that in doing it he has not profaned the festival, for that is the ground on which I based my public plaint against him, and that is the question on which you must presently cast your votes. But if I, waiving the profit which a private suit would bring, entrust his punishment to the State, and if I have chosen this particular form of action from which I can receive no benefit myself, then surely it ought to win me your favour and not prejudice my case.

Now I know that he will also make great use of this argument: Do not deliver me into Demosthenes’ hands; do not ruin me to oblige Demosthenes. Because I am at war with him, will you ruin me? That is the sort of language that he will, I am sure, use again and again, with the object of exciting prejudice against me.

But the truth is quite otherwise. You never deliver a malefactor to his accuser; for when someone has been wronged, you do not exact the penalty in such a form as the injured party urges upon you in each case. On the contrary, laws were laid down by you before the particular offences were committed, when the future wrongdoer and his victim were equally unknown. What is the effect of these laws? They ensure for every citizen the opportunity of obtaining redress if he is wronged. Therefore when you punish a man who breaks the laws, you are not delivering him over to his accusers; you are strengthening the arm of the law in your own interests.